Thursday, March 21, 2013

Rescue mission to have the Court of British Columbia participate in the BC Legislature’s Electoral Reform Referendum

We must be able to stand on guard for Canada
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PETITION RECORD ARGUMENTS

The Rebuttal to the Respondent’s DE MINIMIS application to quash under BC Court Rule 9-5(1)

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Part A: "Can the Petitioner seek a declaration of constitutional invalidity by petition?" AG objections include an application to strike under Court Rule 21(3)

Part B: “The petition is not supported by a sufficient factual basis to allow for proper constitutional adjudication.” “Furthermore, where the evidence before the Court suggests the petitioner sought to make a particular political statement, it may be his rights to expression are relevant by not his voting rights.”

Part C: “With respect, this [Mootness and Futility] should be determinative and put an end to this matter.”

Part D: ”[T]his petition should be dismissed, in any event, because there is no breach of section 3 to be found on the facts of the case. The Attorney General says that any limits imposed by the Regulation on referendum and election advertising do not infringe the right to vote.”

Part E: “From the materials it is unclear whether a declaration pursuant to section 24(1) of the Charter or section 52 of the Constitution Act”




Part A:  Can the Petitioner seek a declaration of constitutional invalidity by petition? Here is an application to strike under BC Court Rule 21(3).

1. This would be the second time the rule was used in the file.

2. In the preliminaries, on 11 March 2009, the Court refused to wave the Court fees for the application. The underlining proceeding must be in the form of a petition, when the action includes an interlocutory injunction. The Proceeding must be started by petition when the application for relief includes the nature of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari or habeas corpus are governed by these Supreme Court Civil Rules and must be started by petition under Rule 16-1. The action was changed to a petition and was accepted by the Court on 18 March 2009.

3. The injunction now moot does not nullify the proceeding. The doctrine of deference advocates political injunctions are to be rebuffed. Political decisions are to be decided after the fact. This mandatory  mootness cannot be used to strike the action based on it being in the form of a petition, as this would be a patent unfairness.

4. This issue can be disposed of readily. Scory v. Langley (Township) 2012 CarswellBC 1862 Subject: Public; Property; Torts; Civil Practice, para[12] “A number of issues raised at this hearing can be disposed of readily. First, the defendant applies to dismiss the plaintiff's claim on the basis that the proceedings should have been brought by way of a petition under the Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 241 and not by notice of claim. The pleading, as filed, seeks a court order compelling the Township to issue a building permit. That relief can only be obtained under the Judicial Review Procedure Act and must be brought by petition under Rule 21-3.” [Formerly Rule 63.] [13] However, the building permit has now been issued, and the plaintiff's remaining claim is primarily for damages for malfeasance of public office. Accordingly, I dismiss the defendant's application to strike the plaintiff's claim on the basis that it has been brought in the wrong form.”

5. The petition is a charter challenge ONLY and contains no additional orders. This is one of many distinct differences from Transpacific Tours Limited v. Director of Investigation and Research (1985) see para 5: “[C]ounsel for the petitioners made it clear that the relief sought is not merely a constitutional remedy. The lack of additional orders changes the sufficient factual basis requirement.”

Part B: Constitutional political challenges involving BC Court Rule 9-5(1)

6. The petition in Pacific Press v. Pacific Press v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 1998 CarswellBC 2631 is the recognized standard for political challenges involving BC Court Rule 9-5(1). The respondent was told this then -- there exists an established stare decisis for political participation already, by the Higher Court, in the Harper, Libman, & Somerville cases. The BC Appeal Court affirmed the chambers decision.

7. The BC chamber’s decision paragraph [12] comments on the benefit of a new novel, political approach on the information, quote “Such an information process does not easily lend itself to the type of summary determination sought here.”  The Pacific decision is our province’s legal information requirement for an undertaking by the Court for a political participation dispute. To invoke BC Court Rule 9-5(1) - quote para 29, "The Court must be satisfied that it is plain and obvious that no case can be established or the plaintiff's claims are certain to fail."


Petitioner submits there is a factual basis

9. The response seems to concede that there is a sufficient factual basis to make this other conclusion.  Response quote, “Furthermore, where the evidence before the Court suggests the petitioner sought to make a particular political statement, it may be his rights to expression are relevant by not his voting rights.”

10. The essential facts are established: The petitioner registered and felt obstructed. The petitioner went to BC Elections to clarify the censorship and was instructed that election advertising could not be part of the referendum message.

11. Please consider Hunt v. T&N [1990] S.C.R. 216 (Civil practice and procedure and BC Court Rule 9-5(1)).  It would be wrong to strike out the petition early -- when the respondent’s claims/tactics depicting the information can be simply dealt with and are peripheral issues. The Court had a moral responsibility. In Hunt, the issue involved asbestos and the harm caused.

12. The factual basis arises also from the respondent’s response quote, “Section 29(4) operates to prevent third parties from circumventing electoral advertising limits under the guise of referendum spending.”


It is the respondent who provides scant evidence to justify regulation 29(4)

13. Similar to the Harper v. Canada (Attorney Genera), the respondent has not one scintilla of evidence to support why the Court should save the impugned regulation. Harper v. Canada [Attorney General] political participation precedent (new law) established the standard for the degree of proof the fact finder requires to render a decision. The Pacific decision reflects this position that democracy is based on principles. To decide voting rights on a sufficient factual basis standard would prejudice, thus the best practice is to use principles and reasoning to decide Charter S.3 disputes.

14. Quote from Harper, “[26] A theoretical objective asserted as pressing and substantial is sufficient for purposes of the s. 1 justification analysis.”

15. Quote from Harper, “[34] Here the concern of the Alberta courts that the Attorney General had not shown any real problem requiring rectification becomes relevant. The dangers posited are wholly hypothetical. The Attorney General presented no evidence that wealthier Canadians — alone or in concert — will dominate political debate during the electoral period absent limits. It offered only the hypothetical possibility that, without limits on citizen spending, problems could arise. If, as urged by the Attorney General, wealthy Canadians are poised to hijack this country’s election process, an expectation of some evidence to that effect is reasonable. Yet none was presented. This minimizes the Attorney General’s assertions of necessity and lends credence to the argument that the legislation is an overreaction to a non-existent problem. 35 On the other side of the equation, the infringement on the right is severe.”


If the petitioner’s referendum advertising is not referendum advertising -- this then proves the point -- that referendum advertising (with specifics) could not exist!

16. The petitioner’s referendum advertising is further obstructed by the suggestion, “In [chief's] case, this might require that he both register and report spending as election advertising, but it does not otherwise restrict him from postering as he proposes." The petitioner  respectfully disagrees, and claims his referendum advertising is referendum advertising.”


“Furthermore, in light of the scant evidence, the Court (as well as the respondent) has no sense of the effects of the impugned law on the petitioner’s right to vote and cannot easily find necessary to undertake proper consideration of the Regulation against recognized standards of constitutional law.”

17. In one single ruling -- Harper v. Canada (Attorney General) -- the entire established legal philosophy to enshrine Democracy was changed. New law was made. The government of the moment has manipulated this spending limits ruling into their warped election advertising definition – which has snowballed into censorship, restricting the combining of facts.

18. This new precedent on spending limits is now being misused -- by the respondent to go off reservation and into the pre campaign period. This is the answer to why the respondent cannot easily find necessary to undertake proper consideration of the Regulation against recognized standards of constitutional law.” This also may answer why no S.1 application is before the bench.


Probative facts to be given little weight , as equality is moot

19. The adjective law is established. When considering spending limits, the Law does not allow the prime facie case to be made for equality in a Charter S.3 decision.

20. The issue is effective representation. Reference re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask),[1991] 2.S.C.R. 158 “It is my conclusion that the purpose of the right to vote enshrined in s.3 of the Charter is not equality of voting power per se. but the right to “effective representation.”   When the Court is entertaining Democracy -- affidavit’s probative facts (facts which the ultimate and decisive facts may be properly inferred – and the Probative value: the relative weight properly accorded particular evidence) are to be given little weight -- in the decision the Court pleases.


Knowledge is power

21. The more the AG also claims information is important in the decision process, only further demonstrates that We the People would benefit from knowledge in the referendum and in the legislature. The Danson and MacKay cases dictate information is important in the decision process.   Both the petitioner and respondent agree that  there is a mountain of evidence to suggest that combining a message with information is important.  An effective message needs to be combined with information. People have brains and need to won over.


The beast of restricting political information undermines the information excuse from being listed as the reason by the Court to quash.

22. The actions of the State obstructing the normal mechanisms for communicating in the pre campaign period – has created a REAL tort liability that protects the inquiry from being dismissed.


Contains pleadings that the information factual basis is not absent

22. BC’s unique election advertising definition and pre campaign period has a substantial factual basis in BC Court decisions. The public record now benefits from the reasons given in the teachers appeal to help create the basis of a full factual record for the referendum infringement.

23.  Furthermore, the public record in Reference re Election Act (BC), 2012 BCCA 394 the AG entered a covenant with the Court that mandates the conclusion -- the information is sufficient to continue for the petition 09-1067. Quote, "[4] The Attorney General (through counsel) advances the case for the government contending the current amendments fully address the offending aspects of the legislation considered in BCTF, thereby rendering the limitations imposed on election advertising by third parties in advance of the campaign period now constitutionally sound."

24. Tradition is re Air Canada (1999),241 N.R. 157 (Fed. C.A.) --- "In order for the reference procedure to work properly, there must be no real argument between the parities, as to the material facts that will form the basis for the answers the Court is asked to give."  Thus, the recent constitutional reference question prevents the excuse of sparse information to quash petition 09-1067.




Right to declaratory relief

25. The petitioner bows to the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity. The petitioner bows to standard bestowed in Guimond v. Quebec (Attorney General) [1996] S.C.R.347 which states that damages can be awarded for the enactment of legislation that is subsequently declared to be unconstitutional, except in the event of good faith, and cases were wrongful conduct does not exist on the part of government institutions.

26. To aid the Court, most all issues are presented as moot. This position offered should not be turned around to say there is insufficient information so the petition is moot. Catch 22. The lack of claims beyond the orders on the table makes it known that the petition is being nice. Since S.29(4)restricted most all topics, this MUST permit the disclosure of the topics censored, does it not? How can a topic be censored AND banned from the decision to right the wrong? BUT Let us not walk the low road. Let us walk the high road.

27. Obviously, the issues are not moot, and especially the post-election HST announcement/provincial pre-post-election budget deficit flip flop announcements right after the ban ended. The impugned regulation restricted several sensitive topics that are off limits to censorship for example:(a) the nearly billion dollar BC Rail tax indemnity contingent liability removal from the 2005 Public Accounts by the Comptroller General, who was then promoted to Auditor General, and then asked to leave.  Revenue Canada is out nearly a billion dollars from the BC Rail tax indemnity.    [The word contingent liability and the accounting term is off limits see recent decision Auditor General v. Attorney General.] (b) the shredding of bc rail email information made known after the election; (c) two days after the General Election the Provincial Deficit disclosed in the Election was changed from 495 million, by government officials. (d) the HST post-election announcement; (e) and the feelings of the People of BC post Election/Referendum AND the near Revolt and exodus of the Premier -- are not good but democracy needs to look good so these issues are moot, as not to prejudice our Democracy. The mandate to encourage voter participation is a civic duty we all share. Please appreciate the subjects are thus moot, reducing the need to access the volumes of evidence. Thus the affidavit evidence is limited and is presented as such. Put simply the petitioner’s reasons for political reform do no concern the orders.

28. Nominal damages can be award as a trivial sum as a recognition that a legal injury was sustained. Nominal damages are awarded to vindicate the plaintiff’s claim where no recoverable loss/force can be established. The protection of a declaratory relief is codified in: Supreme Court Rule 20-4 — Declaratory Relief (1) A proceeding is not open to objection on the ground that only a declaratory order is sought, and the court may make binding declarations of right whether or not consequential relief is or could be claimed.




Part C:  Objections: Mootness and Futility

“Mootness and futility are distinct doctrines. Mootness is a quality of a proceeding. A proceeding is moot when it no longer arises from a live controversy or concrete dispute. Futility in contrast is a quality of remedies. A remedy is futile when it will have no practical effect.”


Mandated mootness

29. It stands to reason that a temporary law can be judged.

30. In Conacher v. Canada (Prime Minister) [2008] Federal Court 3628 a democratic reform organization registered a judicial review application to be heard immediately before the federal election and was told “No”. The issue was made moot by hearing the matter only after the election.

31. Canada’s doctrine of deference advocates thee best practice is to wait till after the political event to hear the petition and intervene. By definition, most election/referendum charter challenges are moot when before the bench. Similarly, the United States, the land of the most plebiscites in history, their best practice advocates that the legal issues around plebiscites are best left to be decided after the People vote for good reason.


The AG -- already being found guilty for violating the Charter in the Election -- must be factored into the moot decision for petition 09-1067

32. The election infringement record of the AG is not a moot consideration, when determining the mootness of petition 09-1067. It sends the wrong message to those that would exploit weaknesses in our Democracy for political gain that the Court thinks this moot. This breeds corruption.   Appreciate please, there a millions of Canadians that believe our Democracy is broken, and by the Court declaring the founding vote moot, would play into this. Therefore, the Court cannot use the moot excuse, as there are Public Interest considerations to respect.


No evidence has been placed before the court detailing why the declaratory Orders would be nugatory and of no practical value.

33. Quote from Friends of the Oldman River, para 109, “Prerogative relief should only be refused on the ground of futility in those few instances where the issuances of a prerogative writ would be effectively nugatory.” “It is a different matter, though, where it cannot be determined a priori that an order in the nature of prerogative relief will have no practical effect.”

34. The terms a priori ("from the earlier", pure reason) and a posteriori ("from the later", experience) are vantage points to determine futility. Each supports the ideas that voters deserve specifics. Common sense and experience like knowledge, obviously. So yes, philosophy preaches information is good -- and is a truism and is an a priori. The importance of independent voices in the political process is an effective representation a priori.

35. Let us not miss the point though, the infraction S29(4) was real and the orders address a wrong. The orders are not hypothetical.


Future Citizens Assemblies on electoral reform benefit from the orders.

36. The BC Citizens Assembly Final Report 2004 makes not reference for this need for censorship. Be assured, the Assembly would have made a fuss, if they knew about 29(4).  Therefore, the orders are not nugatory. In Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511 the Court declared the Province has a responsibility to consult stakeholders.  The decision of the Court serves and protects the future of Canada and the Provinces. This is an incredibly valuable gift the Court can give to our Great Nation.


National importance

37. Quote: Haig v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), - [1992] 3 S.C.R. 163 - 1992-10-22 “Having granted leave, we are obviously of the view that this appeal will raise issues of public, indeed, national, importance. The decisions of this Court, being the court of final appeal, are binding upon all other courts in the land.”

38. Quote: Haig v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 995. The Supreme Court comments: “ [160] Under the circumstances, as the referendum has already taken place, any remedy is more theoretical than real.” “Hopefully, the Canada Elections Act or Referendum Act provisions will be clarified if Parliament decides to hold a referendum in the future.”


Badge of Honour for the Court to defend democracy and say “NO”

39. Quote from the honourable Cory J in Haig: ”All forms of democratic government are founded upon the right to vote. Without that right, democracy cannot exist. The marking of a ballot is the mark of distinction of citizens of a democracy. It is a proud badge of freedom. While the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees certain electoral rights, the right to vote is generally granted and defined by statute. That statutory right is so fundamental that a broad and liberal interpretation must be given to it. Every reasonable effort should be made to enfranchise citizens. Conversely, every care should be taken to guard against disenfranchisement.”


The Court mandate to encourage voter participation enshrines the founding vote

40. The current mode of operation of the BC Legislature is born from the referendum.  The doctrine of deference requires this not be belittled. There is a symbolic significance to this past event. Credibility requires that political censorship affecting this be reviewable.    It would prejudice democracy to find this moot.


Limits placed on using the word moot when encouraging voter participation

41. It is an error of law to make the finding that the petitioner’s advertising is moot and futile. Harper [44] “This amounts to saying that even if the breach … is not justified; it does not matter because it affects only a few people. Charter breaches cannot be justified on this basis.”   Said another way, it is a colour of law offense to use the excuse that the petitioner is tiny and irrelevant, therefore his political rights are moot.    


Federal Court Practice

42. Quote from Carswell Federal Court Practice, "The Court is reluctant to entertain motions to strike judicial review applications. Generally, the proper way for a respondent to contest an application which it believes to be without merit, is to appear and argue at the hearing of the application itself. A motion to strike should only be brought where the application is so clearly improper as to be without any possibility of success.”


Tradition

43. The courts have always recognized the fundamental importance of the vote and the necessity to give a broad interpretation to the statutes which provide for it. This traditional approach is not only sound it is essential for the preservation of democratic rights.

44. Quote, “Cawley v. Branchflower (1884), 1 B.C.R. (Pt. II) 35 (S.C.). Crease J. wrote at p. 37: The law is very jealous of the franchise, and will not take it away from a voter if the Act has been reasonably complied with. . . . It looks to realities, not technicalities or mere formalities, unless where forms are by law, especially criminal law, essential, or affect the subject-matter under dispute. [Emphasis added.]”

45. Quote, “To the same effect in Re Lincoln Election (1876), 2 O.A.R. 316, Blake V.C. stated (at p. 323): The Court is anxious to allow the person who claims it the right to exercise the franchise, in every case in which there has been a reasonable compliance with the statute which gives him the right he seeks to avail himself of. No merely formal or immaterial matter should be allowed to interfere with the voter exercising the franchise . . . .”

British Columbia case law on amending petitions

46. Merit counts in accepting an amended petition. Leave can be granted for clarification and particularization purposes. The amended petition was for particularization. The Province is not a private citizen is a key distinction. The British Columbia Court has commented on the State is different and therefore there are a different set of measures in Haida Nation v. British Columbia(2000) 2067.

47. Merit is the established standard in British Columbia. Chaudhry v. British Columbia (2005) 1361: Quote: “The original petition was filed 1998. It refers to events in 1995 and 1997. The amended petition was filed 2004, more than six years after the events complained of. As mentioned, the amended petition was presented without leave first having been obtained. It is the applicant's position that Rule 24 (1)(a) [BC Supreme Court rules renumbered in 2010] permits an amendment without leave so long as the matter is not set down for a hearing. The Court standard to dismiss is based on quote: “Having concluded that there is no merit in the matters sought to be appealed and no reasonable prospect that a division of this Court would allow the appeal, I dismiss the application for leave.” [Emphasis added.]

48. Halvorson v. British Columbia (Medical Services Commission) [2010] BC Court of Appeal 1336: Quote, “In unusual circumstances of case, it was best for parties to step back from further amended petition and statement of claim and begin again.” “The judge found that some further particularization was also required in order to understand[.] “Procedural issues were significant to claim, which had been stalled for over five years, and significant to practice of class actions.”


The petitioner’s  reasons for delay

49. The petitioner’s  reasons for delay include the filing a leave to appeal to challenge the BC Constitutional Questions Act writ of mandamus issued by the Attorney General , and to appeal the affirmed Charter S.2d association & S.3 determinations: The Court number is: B.C. Teachers’ Federation v. B.C. (Attorney General), BC COURT OF APPEAL (file no. 38495).


No charges pending

50. The respondent’s first response clarifies that no charges are pending for Electoral Reform Referendum 2009 Act Regulation Section 29(4). The State’s still obstructed the petitioner’s political reform activities.


The AG’s list of authorities include the right to life case Borowski

51. The Borowski v. Canada (Attorney General)[1989] 1 S.C.R. 342 right-to-life case law example, supports the right of petition 09-1067 to a determination, as the charter challenge is not yet determined and is a real issue as defined in Borowski.  The Borowski writ was made moot because of a prosecution in a separate proceeding which meant the Court had already dealt with the underlying issue. The underlying issue has not been dealt with in petition 09-1067, which is a key difference from Borowski.

52. Metaphorically, this is also a right to life case. Democracy was giving birth and was attacked. Democracy cries for justice from Her Court. In no way is this moot. This is the foundation stone of the doctrine of deference.   


The Caveat in MacKay v. Manitoba, paragraph 22 concerning information

50. The Arbitrator has no duty to act and can end the inquiry if there is an enhancement. But, when the political interference does not improve our political activities, now the MacKay precedent affirms the (political participation) writ’s right to a determination. The MacKay paragraph [22] quote defending democracy, “The Act does not prohibit a taxpayer or anyone else from holding or expressing any position or their belief in any position, Rather the Act seems to foster and encourage the dissemination and expression of a wide range of views and positions.”


Part D: Jurisdiction

The Court’s expedition to the charter mountain range and climb up charter 3 mountain.  

Response quote [47] ”[T]his petition should be dismissed, in any event, because there is no breach of section 3 to be found on the facts of the case. The Attorney General says that any limits imposed by the Regulation on referendum and election advertising do not infringe the right to vote.”


Section 33 of Charter permits local politicians to remove the Court's jurisdiction to guard civil rights

52. To find there is no jurisdiction here is profound. This translates the Legislature building blocks are subject to Section 33’s notwithstanding provision. This would be a clear and present danger to Canada. Canada’s founding document by design removed the right of locals to invoke Section 33 for this material. The Courts MUST have the absolute authority to make a decision in a Charter S.3 breach.   We must be able to stand on guard for Canada.
53. In Baier v. Alberta [2004] ABQ 669 there is a discussion of the jurisdiction differences between s2b and s.3. It points out that Section 3 is protected from s.33; whereas s.2b is not. In Baier the case was not s.3 material, as it involved school board democracy.

Petition 09-1067 Order One deals with the Referendum &Order Two deals with the Election

54. Even if the interpretation is that the Referendum is not protected by section 3, there is still the issue of Order 2 concerning the election infringement. The orders are independent and mutually exclusive. And as such, the claim there is not jurisdiction must climb two separate mountains to dismiss on jurisdiction.   


There are legal complexities using the precedent in B.C. Teachers’ Federation v. B.C. (Attorney General), 2009 BCSC 436 to assert that there is no s.3 jurisdiction. The reasons given indicate there was jurisdiction to give a s.3 analysis.

55. The AG commanding the Court with a writ of mandamus impacted the Court's decision. This reduces the authority of the AG to use this example to define jurisdiction in other cases. For good reason, Court decisions must not infringe s.3. In addition, the AG is not claiming as it did in that case that para 104 quote " Thus, says the Attorney General, the restrictions are supportive of the democratic interests that animate the s. 3 right to vote."

56. Quote para 105, "Contrary to the submissions of the plaintiffs and as I discuss elsewhere in these Reasons, I find that a modest informational campaign is the standard for a constitutionally acceptable advertising campaign, and that the impugned restrictions allow for such campaigns."


If and only if there is a s. 3 breach allows a spending limit to be declared no force and effect.

57. The Supreme Court of Canada's logic in Harper establishes that s.3 is the determining factor whether or not to affirm a spending limit. Obviously, spending limits do infringe s2b, BUT since s.3 requires it, the s.2b freedom of speech infringement is saved under s.1. Therefore, the legal debate to affirm is a consequence of the s. 3 consideration. It is an error of law to equate that there was no s.3 infringement, means there is no s.3 jurisdiction.


Even if, spending limits are not protected by s.3 as the AG presents, it still does not determine the jurisdiction on content

58. The Harper spending limit decision does not restrict content.  Quote, "The limits set out in s.350 allow third parties to inform the electorate of their message."   The same cannot be said for 29(4) that it allows third parties to inform the electorate of their message. A spending limit does not limit content. A spending limit by definition only limits the amount of times it can be reproduced. This suggests it is an error of law to misuse the Harper case law to say what it does not say,  to remove the Court's jurisdiction.


Discussion on spending limits DOES NOT determine the jurisdiction on a ban on content. Not the same.

59. Fundamental difference between a spending limit and restricting content.   In the book by J. Patrick Boyer, titled Political Rights - The Legal Framework of Elections in Canada,  the theme is content is not a subject matter the Court regulates in a democracy. The book pre dates the Charter,  represents our tradition that the people’s faith in Democracy is a consequence of the Court maintaining the right of citizens to express their range of ideas. The book quotes the 1968 Ontario Law Reform Commission, "An informed electorate is the bed-rock of our democracy."


The BC Attorney General is on record in Pacific Press v BC (AG) that the Quebec referendum on the Charlottetown Accord conclusively determined the constitutionality on voting rights for spending limits.

60. Paragraph 2 quote from BC Court of Appeal  "The appellant [THE AG]  contends that the chambers judge erred in refusing to strike the claims on the grounds that the Supreme Court of Canada has already conclusively determined the constitutionality of the impugned provisions of the Election Act in its reasons for judgment in Libman c. Quebec (Procureur general) 1997."


The Haig case established that a referendum does have s.3 rights when the referendum involves our right to vote.

61. A strong case can be made that the BC Legislature Founding Vote meets the criteria in Haig to establish s.3 jurisdiction. Quote from the Honourable Cory J in Haig, “During the course of the hearing an argument was advanced that a referendum was distinct from and less important than an election. It was argued that, as a result, the generous principles applicable to the right to vote in elections should not apply with the same force to a referendum. I cannot accept that contention. A vast amount of public study, effort and time was expended in drafting the terms of the Charlottetown Accord. Every effort was made to advise Canadians of the importance of the referendum pertaining to it and the significance of the vote of every citizen. The number of voters exercising their franchise in the referendum was comparable to the turnout in federal elections. In the minds of most Canadians, the referendum was every bit as important as an election. If it was not, then Canadians would be clearly justified in wondering what all the fuss was about. The same principles applicable to the right to vote in elections should be applied in the same manner to the right to vote in a referendum.”




Part E: The respondent asks, “From the materials it is unclear whether a declaration pursuant to section 24(1) of the Charter or section 52 of the Constitution Act”

62. Quote, "[70] The remedy proposed by Constable Ferguson is thus distinct from a s.52 remedy." Whereas, the petition 09- 1067 orders are not distinct from a s.52 remedy.

63. Quote from R. v. Ferguson [2008] 1 S.C.R. 96, “[59] The jurisprudence affirming s.52(1) as the appropriate remedy for laws that produce unconstitutional effects is based on the language chosen by the framers of the Charter. [60] Section 24(1), by contrast, is generally used as a remedy, not for unconstitutional laws, but for unconstitutional government acts committed under the authority of legal regimes which are accepted as fully constitutional.” “[61] Thus this Court has repeatedly affirmed that the validity of laws is determined by S.52 of the Constitutional Act, 1982, while the validity of government action falls to be determined under s.24 of the Charter."

64. Quote “[63] The jurisprudence of this Court allows a s.24(1) remedy in connection with a s.52(1) declaration of invalidity in unusual cases where additional s.24(1) relief is necessary to provide the claimant with an effective remedy. “ Again there is no additional relief. The order challenging the validity of the law was registered while the short term law was real. The effective remedy to denounce the expired temporary law, may require a connection of a s.24(1) remedy if the Attorney General’s deems this necessary. To negate the political interference of the AG to an unconstitutional government act s.24(1) (category: a personal remedy) is the domain of the Court to determine.

65. The PER CURIAM repeatedly affirms that s.24(1) cannot provide a stand-alone decision when the constitutionality of a law is challenged. Unconstitutional laws are deprived of effect to the extent of their inconsistency, are not left on the books subject to discretionary case by case s.24(1) remedies.

Wednesday, February 27, 2013

We must lobby that there is No proprietary knowledge on plastics anymore


Plastic is an expensive negative externality to the world economy and human health
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Plastic must dislcose what's in it.  Urgent to develop regulations that:  the  seller can longer can unload plastic; ain't going to buy it or make it to start then, if only lend it and is returned after use. No right to pollute.

There is business in changing the type of containers products are sold in to recyclable containers.  Consumers embrace recyclable containers and we can finance the new employment.   



A least it not in the rain water.
Quote, "The smallest particles so far detected had a diameter of one micrometre which is one thousandth of a millimetre. Complex investigations are required to be able to determine such tiny plastic objects exactly and clarify their origins. "We recommend to every scientist to analyse very small microplastic particles using an infrared spectroscope. This procedure uncovers the constituents and permits an exact identification as a plastic." 
Quote, "Scientists refer to these plastic particles as "microplastic particles," understanding these to mean plastic objects whose diameter is less than five millimetres -- whereby the majority of microplastic particles are smaller than a grain of sand."





Tuesday, November 13, 2012

Next generation democracies

Political free speech in Canada
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THE PETITIONER APPLIES FOR THESE ORDERS:

[The General Election and the Single Transferable Vote Referendum are independent events.]


Order 1: The Court is requested in a written disposition to declare -- the Petitioner`s Charter Three Guaranteed Rights are infringed in British Columbia’s Single Transferable Vote Referendum -- by Electoral Reform Referendum 2009 Act Regulations Section 29.4: (Referendum advertising must not, directly or indirectly, (a) promote a registered political party or the election of a candidate or (b) form part of election advertising,) for 3 months and 12 days.

Order 2: The Court is requested in a written disposition to declare -- the Petitioner`s Charter Three Guaranteed Rights are infringed in British Columbia’s General Election -- by Electoral Reform Referendum 2009 Act Regulations Section 29.4: (Referendum advertising must not, directly or indirectly, (a) promote a registered political party or the election of a candidate or (b) form part of election advertising,) for 3 months and 12 days. BC Elections defines Electoral Reform Regulation 29.4 as making it the law that election advertisers could not represent by any means which candidates supported STV directly or indirectly for just the May 09 General Election.

Order 3: COSTS




Part 2: FACTUAL BASIS
[Using numbered paragraphs, set out the material facts on which this petition is based.]



1 The original petition was registered and served on April 9th 2009 during the Single Transferable Vote Referendum. The BC Attorney General waited a month and issued the response on May 11th 2009 the day before the General Election and Referendum. The response postulated the petition is moot as the referendum restrictions would soon expire. The response fails to appreciate it is a colour of law infraction to trespass on civil rights. The Citizens Assembly that created STV did not permit this censorship. In order for Democracy to prevail, this is a mandatory review under both the Federal Laws of Canada and the Laws of British Columbia.

2 The 2009 British Columbia Referendum was the last time a Canadian electorate was honoured with the ability to advance Democracy. In 2005, British Columbia was the first in Canada to have a Legislature Founding Vote with no restrictions. PEI had a similar referendum shortly after 2005 with no restrictions -- and Ontario in 2007 with no restrictions.

3 In a Constitutional Democracy, it should be considered a harmful unfairness, when one group is subject to a regulation, while another is not regardless of whether or not they are the “free press.” At the petition hearing I will present an “empty” folder depicting the number of articles in which the Public was made aware of the gazetted impugned regulation. Regulation 29.4, was referenced to once ; and for ( self- preservation purposes), after the GOVERNMENT was pressured to repeal , was the imminent ( still standing ) disaster referenced to and then only in a gazetted context to elected politicians -- while keeping the people of this province blind through the lack of any information on the matter. The Election Act ``gag law`` is not the referendum regulation 29.4. Surreptitiously so, the mainstream newspapers -- The Times Colonist, The Vancouver Sun, The Province -- failed to inform the citizens of this province of an impending breach to their freedom of speech, thought and association. The people of this province cannot be expected to sacrifice the very foundation upon which our freedoms and justice is based. To allow such tactics to precede (in order to capitulate) citizens’ rights would have the effect of a subliminal brainwashing technique leaving citizens a lobotomized political system. The disadvantaged have to compete with the free press -- some call this the ignored infringement in campaign finance reform.

4 Regulation 29.4 banned most all reasonable topics in our political participation -- and the legal inquiry does not permit digressions into these topics for good reason. Deference must be shown to Democracy. Issues of prejudice are considerations. The agreement is that the political issues are moot only after the Court dismisses the motion to quash this petition. In a nutshell the petition is respectfully in its comments. This petition is for every man, woman, and child in this country.



Legal facts:
[Using numbered paragraphs, specify any rule or other enactment relied on and provide a brief summary of any other legal bases on which the petitioner intends to rely in support of the orders sought.]
1 The Court affirming actions of Malum Prohibitum and limiting political participation in British Columbia is a slippery slope.

2 Our Constitutional Democracy -- in the 1982 Constitution Act Part One Canadian Rights and Freedoms Section 15(2) -- authorizes statutory provisions granting rights to appeal affirmed action to restrict political reform free speech. Those who seek to uphold discriminatory laws, programs, or activities as affirmative action are accordingly obliged when challenged to demonstrate that the object of the measure it to relieve the disadvantaged. The petition involves the disadvantaged and invokes this right.

3 All Courts share the mandate to encourage voter participation. No international law in the English Common Wealth advancing Legislature Democracy bans as many topics as does Regulation 29.4 in a free and democratic society. International Law enshrines the right to information. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 a (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Can. T.S. 1976 No. 47 – are inconsistent with the impugned regulation.

4 The Doctrine of Deference also includes the responsibility of saying no when the local politicians repeal the law only for themselves. It includes the responsibility of saying no when there is no disclosure of the new restrictions -- in the Legislature’s public record in the three readings of the BC Referendum Act. Prudence speaks to this in B.C. Teachers’ Federation v. B.C. (Attorney General), 2011 BCCA 408: Quote “[265]”To the extent that the Attorney General’s position rests on the proposition that restrictions on third party election advertising are necessary during the pre-campaign period to protect the financing regime, since spending restrictions have been imposed on political parties and candidates during that same period, the reasoning is circular. If those limits on political parties and candidates did not exist (and there is no evidentiary or logical basis for their necessity), then that rationale for restricting third party spending evaporates. Consequently, the legislation does not achieve the objectives of promoting equality in the political discourse and protecting the integrity of the financial regime applicable to candidates and parties.”

5 The Court of British Columbia has now spoken three times against this extreme election advertising definition. The Court has repeatedly said,” It captures virtually all political expression regardless of whether such is intended to influence the election, and, as explained, all individuals and organizations are affected even if their election advertising is voluntary.” This suggests that referendum advertising was banned from virtually all political expression.

6 Electoral Reform Regulation 29.4 would not pass the fundamental consideration in Canada’s leading jurisprudence in political participation Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] 33 SCC. Quote, “The first inquiry in determining whether the infringement is proportionate to the harm done is whether there is a rational connection between the infringing measure and the pressing and substantial objective that the infringement is said to serve.” The dissenting justices argued that the spending limit in the Canada Elections Act is inconsistent as the third party limits were too restrictive.” If and only if the political restriction limit is not too restrictive would a free and democratic society bow to said political affirmative action. The Prime Minister sought to safe guard our political participation rights. “It is important to recognize that the spending limits do not constrain the right of only a few citizens to speak. They constrain the political speech of all Canadians, be they of superior or modest means.”

7 The Supreme Court of Canada has rejected referendum spending limits and said no in Libman v. Quebec (Attorney General) [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569. The Highest Court declared the Referendum Act which limited third party expenditure infringed the Charter, and overturned the Court of Quebec, the Quebec Superior Court Quebec Superior Court, and the Quebec Court of Appeal . Quote, [84] However, it is clear from our analysis that protecting the fairness of referendum campaigns is a laudable objective that will necessarily involve certain restrictions on freedom of expression. Freedom of political expression, so dear to our democratic tradition, would lose much value if it could only be exercised in a context in which the economic power of the most affluent members of society constituted the ultimate guidepost of our political choices. Nor would it be much better served by a system that undermined the confidence of citizens in the referendum process.” ”The Supreme Court of Canada found that the objectives of the Act "to permit an informed choice to be made by ensuring that some positions are not buried by others" and "to preserve the confidence of the electorate in a democratic process that it knows will not be dominated by the power of money" are valid and praiseworthy. However, ruling out third party expenditure altogether was too restrictive to be justified as a reasonable limit.”

8 The Courts have said no before in British Columbia’s Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General)1997 File No.: 25593 and protected the rights of pollsters to the election process. Quote, ``As part of this s.1 analysis, the court must also consider the importance of the free exchange of ideas which has recognized to be an essential democratic value of our society.`` The Supreme Court of Canada impugned Canada Election Act S.322.1 and but did not comment on the Charter 3 test.

9 The Courts have said no before to political participation spending limits in Somerville v. Canada (Attorney General) [1996] 37 C.R.R Quote, “The first stage of the test concerns the importance and significance of the objective(s) that the measures in question are designed to pursue. While the objectives might be one thing, the reality in the light of the expansive restrictions on rights and freedoms that they entail might be quite another.” “The Court did not accept that the objective is sufficiently important or pressing to justify the breach of the Charter rights, Since the impugned provisions failed the test of importance in terms of the objective they were designed to meet, there was no real need for the trial judge to assess the proportionality of the provisions in relation to the objective.”

10 It is postulated that if we the political reformers had won the referendum -- and if the Court entertained an action on this Electoral Regulation 29.4 -- then the Court would be challenged and would have to set aside the referendum results. Unfortunately, because of this shut up regulation, if we won, we lost and if we lost, we lost. The legal quagmire is not fair to the Courts to overturn a super majority; and thereby it is not fair to the Courts such a law would do this, so the Court has to impugn.

11 In a Section Three Charter challenge, the constitutional question is not directly whether the “right to information” was breached -- but whether a restriction placed on information has diminished or undermined the right to vote in a genuine election. It is therefore necessary to examine the information restriction in the context of the whole electoral process before finding a S.3 was violated. Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] SCC 37 S.C.R. 912 the Court rejected the 50 candidate rule and the expropriation of party funds. The case law's guiding legal principle was: “The democratic rights entrenched in S.3 ensure that each citizen has an opportunity to express an opinion about the formation of public policy and the function of public institutions through participation in the electoral process.”

12 Why only a Section Three Charter challenge? The logic is both Canada and the Court have inalienable rights to participate in changes in Provincial Democracies. Nevertheless, Charter Section 33 translates the Charter can be set aside if a Province so wishes. In other words, the fate of Canadian Democracy -- rests on whether or not -- political participation infringements in switches in democracy are inalienable rights and are registered as Charter S.3 rights. The only difference between an order that states an infringement is Charter S.2b and Charter S.3 -- is our democratic rights and the jurisdiction of the Court to hear a political participation petition are shielded from Charter S.33. In Baier v. Alberta [2004] ABQ 669 dealing with school board democracy the decision commented that S.3 challenges carry doctrine of deference Charter S.33 rights (both for the petition and the Court.) The legal question that plebiscites are within government discretion -- and that S.3 of the Charter does not include plebiscites – this rule of thumb is not applicable to switches in a Legislature`s Democracy. In the case law Haig v. Canada [1993] S.C.R it makes sense that a plebiscite to affirm constitutional amendments of Canada was public relations which most Provinces just signed off on was not sufficient in Haig to claim a Charter S.3 infringement.

13 To quash the petition and yet not address the infringement would be an error of law. The motion to quash the petition requires special consideration because this is censorship. Though the Court is not tasked with invoking Charter Section 52 and declaring the law is of no force and effect -- this does not moot the right of the Court to judge this infringement -- as the law was in force and infected both events. Just because mundane regulations (that do not involve censorship) are moot when repealed, does not make the founding vote regulation moot when its job was accomplished. The doctrine of deference would be placed in peril if after a founding vote cheating issues are moot. The honour of Canada and British Columbia would be tarnished to declare the infringement moot. The Courts of the past protect Democracy in the womb. This is a fiduciary duty of the Court of British Columbia. In America the land of the most referendums in history, referendum legal proceedings are after the vote for good reason, which is a guiding rule in referendum dispute hearings. There are specific issues that remove the right of the government to claim the petition is moot. Out of respect, these issues are moot.

14 Concern and Consideration one: The Province is to produce an affidavit from BC Elections. The independent agency BC Elections has stated that they will only do what the Court directs them to do in regards to this matter before the Court. The BC Elections disposition is critical to attach the referendum regulation to the general election. The definition given by BC Elections is that – referendum advertisers were banned from any topic that could be defined as election advertising. It would assist all parties concerned that BC Elections provide their interpretation of the definition on how the regulation affected both events -- rather than having the Court make the order.

15 Concern and Consideration two: In protecting political civil rights -- it is vital to see the free press as a political lobby: See fox news. British Columbia does have this media political lobby issue.  The Occupation Wall St movement wishes to compete. Pareto Optimal Questions. The disadvantage has a right to reject said affirmative action political free speech laws, because the affirmative action makes them worse off. Freedom of the Press represents special interests and therefore the Court cannot limit the individual as he or she has to compete with that. Catch 22.


16 History of Regulations: On 12 September 2005, the Speech from the Throne, indicated that the government would schedule another referendum at the same time as the November 2008 municipal elections. On May 25th 2006 the date scheduled for the second referendum was then changed to occur in tandem with the May12th 2009 General Election. The Parliament of Canada states the BC Elections Chief Electoral Officer requested the Referendum date be changed. The original Electoral Reform Referendum Regulation 29 was gazetted on Oct 9th, 2008 and then repealed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council on Dec 11th, 2008 which at first banned Members of the Legislature and candidates from combining election advertising and political reform advertising. The Legislature dates were: the first reading was on Thursday, March 6th 2008; the second reading Monday, March 10th, 2008; and third reading Monday, March 31st 2008. The petition forwards the date was changed to give hope, as a lost referendum before the election was an election issue. See BC Elections disposition.

17 This executive privilege passage does not authorize the legal authority to create election law!
BC Referendum Act S.1.1: If the Lieutenant Governor in Council considers that an expression of public opinion is desirable on any matter of public interest or concern, the Lieutenant Governor in Council may, by regulation, order that a referendum be conducted in the manner provided for in this Act. R. v. Heywood, [1994] S.C.R. 761 A law that is over broad is one in which the means are too sweeping in relation to the objective British Columbia Interpretation Act, S41.1(a): The Lieutenant Governor in Council is restricted from enacting regulations that are inconsistent with carrying out the enactment.
18 Electoral Reform Referendum 2009 Act Regulations Section 29.4: (Referendum advertising must not, directly or indirectly, (a) promote a registered political party or the election of a candidate or (b) form part of election advertising.) Electoral Reform Referendum 2009 Act Regulation Definition: The referendum campaign period means, in relation to the referendum, the period beginning on February 1, 2009 and ending at the close of general voting for the referendum [May 12th, 2009.]

19 Gag law BC Election Act S.228: Election adverting is defined as the transmission to the public by any means, during the period beginning 60 days before a campaign period and ending at the end of the campaign period, of an advertising message that promotes or opposes, directly or indirectly, a registered political party or the election of a candidate, including an advertising message that takes a position on an issue with which a registered political party or candidate is associated with. B.C. Teachers’ Federation v. B.C. (Attorney General) 2009 BCSC 436: The Justice issued a finding of fact that practical speaking the BC election advertising definition includes all topics. [246] ”Practically speaking, it is not readily apparent when an issue is not associated with a candidate or political party. The Liberal Party’s campaign platform for the 2005 election demonstrates the extent to which this is the case. Entitled A Proven Plan for a Golden Decade, the document (BC Liberal Party: 2005) sets out the party’s platform regarding a wide range of topics: education, including life-long learning and advanced education; the arts; cultural diversity; healthier living and physical fitness; health care; seniors; children and families; First Nations; women; public safety; democratic reform; partnerships with local governments; parks; environmental protection; job creation; free enterprise; income taxes; research and technology; forestry industry; sustainable development in the energy and mining industries; the 2010 Olympics; tourism; new “gateways” to the Asia Pacific; transportation; northern development; regional growth; and relations with the federal government and other provinces.``

Monday, October 1, 2012

Johnny Ah MacDonalds endorses Obama for President

President Obama inspires ask not what your Country can do for you, but what you can for your Country
Order 1:  To declare British Columbia’s Democracy Founding Vote infringed the petitioner`s Charter Three Guaranteed Rights -- by the Impugned Electoral Reform Referendum 2009 Act Regulations Section 29.4 (Referendum advertising must not, directly or indirectly, (a) promote a registered political party or the election of a candidate or (b) form part of election advertising,).

Order 2:  To declare British Columbia’s  General  Election infringed the petitioner`s Charter Three Guaranteed Rights -- by the Impugned Electoral Reform Referendum 2009 Act Regulations Section 29.4: (Referendum advertising must not, directly or indirectly, (a) promote a registered political party or the election of a candidate or (b) form part of election advertising,).  The impugned regulation infringed the petitioners Charter 3 right to the guarantee of effective representation.
Political reform advertisers for all practical purposes were barred from the newspapers and on TV etc. – the exception to the rule was that we were allow unlimited access to running simplistic advertising limited to saying vote yes or no for STV.   BC Elections has indicated that election advertisers were banned from mentioning which candidates supported STV directly or indirectly for just the May 09 General Election because of Electoral Reform Regulation 29.4. The Province is to produce an affidavit from BC Elections.

Friday, July 15, 2011

Obama's jobs bill: building North America's light rail systems

The economist Keynes thoughts on infrastructure spending included that the final product would reduce costs for society
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Stimulus spending creates construction jobs, more importantly it creates infrastructure that provides benefits for all micro participants in perpetuity. Cheap access to light rail is a significant advantage to a local economy. Unique opportunity to do something big. Reduced transportation costs and reduced car expenses builds society's wealth. For example cheap access to light rail provides benefits to students etc. and increases spending elsewhere.

notes to reduce light rail construction costs. Construction costs are wasted in renting excavators. Can own a few excavators and take longer, but cheaper to construct. Slogan: take twice as long to build but at half the construction cost. Design: types and size of trains used to build a local train fleet are also important to access transporation utility functions.

Friday, October 15, 2010

Priority of the Fedeal Reserve M4 dream to succeed here

Leave to appeal amended
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And further take notice that the Court of Appeal will be moved at the hearing of this application for an order that:

[1] Under Court of Appeal Rule 4, this leave to appeal is amended and seeks these orders.

[2] Seek an Order to reverse Justice Cole’s decision that the Court had no jurisdiction to make a decision. When it warrants it, the Court can disregard British Columbia’s Constitutional Question Act; and therefore, the Court did have the jurisdiction to strike down Bill 42 section’s 198(1)a & 199(1)a. A Justice has no discretion to deviate from Federal law, and must strictly adhere to Charter Section 33’s court rules approach on a notwithstanding provision.

[3] Seek an order that Bill 42 impugned provisions must be registered under Section 33 of the Charter. This is the first question that the Court should be asking when the Province removed all doubt, and went on record that these provisions do infringe on Charter Section 2b.

[4] Seek an order to have certain topics be excluded from the political advertising definition: the budget deficit and the BC Rail tax indemnity. The Appeal Court has been asked by the Province to validate the election advertising definition and permit the censoring of every topic. It’s very complex to support this complex law. The Court cannot even consider censoring every issue, unless specifics have an opportunity to be raised.

[5] Seek an Order that some of the intervener’s arguments should have been considered, as the discretion to ignore the intervener is based on case law whose subject matter does not define the nature of Democracy.

[6] Seek an Order to reverse Justice Cole’s Charter Section 3 finding. By definition, striking down an election law must mean it violates Section 3. Its’ not logical to find that Section 3 of the Charter information component is kosher with Bill 42, yet it violates the Charter and cannot stand?! There is no discretion to slice this both ways.

[7] Seek a cost order that the plaintiff will not owe any funds to pay for the defendant’s costs, based on BC Court Rules pubic interest doctrine, appendix b, party and party costs 3b.

[8] Seek a cost order that on a successful appeal that the plaintiff’s legal costs are to be reimbursed by the Province. This appeal has a strong pubic interest, and is essential to the administration of law.

Wednesday, October 13, 2010

“committed industrial sabotage” by running false news reports in Canwest Publishing Inc. (Canwest) newspapers

"The monitor has unequivocally denied having any influence whatsoever over the editorial content of Canwest newspapers and stated that it does not prepare any news releases on behalf of Canwest."
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Re: In the Matter of the CCAA Proceedings of Canwest Publishing Inc.

"We have reviewed your complaint made on May 13, 2010 that the monitor in the above proceedings, FTI Consulting Canada Inc., had “committed industrial sabotage” by running false news reports in Canwest Publishing Inc. (Canwest) newspapers to the effect that Canada’s banks are the main backers behind the senior secured creditors $950 million stalking horse bid. The results of our review are as follows.

Information provided by the monitor indicates that the five major Canadian banks, the Bank of Nova Scotia, the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, TD Canada Trust, the Bank of Montreal, and the Royal Bank of Canada, are all represented on the steering committee for the senior secured lenders who have advanced the stalking horse bid. Furthermore, the Canadian bank’s share of the total debt of all the members of the steering committee is 63%. In light of the foregoing it cannot be said that the quotes from various newspaper stories you have provided in your May 13, 2010 email are inaccurate or misleading with respect to who is promoting and supporting the senior secured lender’s credit bid.

The monitor has unequivocally denied having any influence whatsoever over the editorial content of Canwest newspapers and stated that it does not prepare any news releases on behalf of Canwest. Our review has not uncovered any evidence that contradicts these statements.

Our review of the information provided by yourself and the facts concerning the alleged issue, as reported by the monitor, have not established any misconduct on the part of the monitor with respect to these proceedings."

Sincerely,
Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy Canada
Senior Bankruptcy Analyst







In concluding this matter, we thank you for contacting us and regret that we cannot be of more assistance to you with respect to it.