SEC Canada issues ruling: Canwest TV assets can not be sold to Goldman Sachs, before the debts of Canwest TV network are settled
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Canwest, subject to regulatory approval, committed to combine its Canadian Television operations with Goldman Sachs Atlantis operations, prior to August 2011. In 2011, the Company’s and Goldman Sachs’ economic interest in the Combined Operations will be determined based on a formula which is based on thecombined segment operating profit of CW Media and Canwest’s Canadian Televisionoperations.
The Alliance Atlantis long term debt of $304 million was assumed by the Company and immediately repaid. The acquisition was financed through the CanWest investment of$262 million for its 35% equity interest, Goldman Sachs’ contribution of $481 million inexchange for its puttable interest and debt financing of $767 million, net of debt issuance costs of $23 million.
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/shaw-wins-court-fight-for-canwest-assets/article1475436/
http://www.montrealgazette.com/Goldman+worse+position+after+Canwest+Shaw+deal+judge/2629847/story.html
The decision sets up a possible battle between Shaw and Goldman. Shaw's next step is to renegotiate a three-year deal with the New York investment bank that governs ownership of CanWest's television unit. In court, the lawyer for Goldman Sachs repeated a frequent complaint that it had been left out of the process, while Shaw argued that negotiations with Goldman were the second step after the equity arrangements were in place.
Under the terms of the sale of CanWest, Shaw has not been able to talk to Goldman. A source close to the Shaw negotiations said the time will come to negotiate with Goldman, and the company could work with them.
http://www.montrealgazette.com/Goldman+worse+position+after+Canwest+Shaw+deal+judge/2629847/story.html
Shaw should both buy 50 percent of Canwest stock from Canwest treasury, and also be buying stock to increase this ownership percent; for example a Shaw buyin of 200 million; translates that for every percent of Canwest shares that Shaw buys on the open market; Shaw recieves back 2 million.
Shaw should be going to the stock exchange and buying Canwest stock
It's good business and reduces Shaw's Canwest buyin costs, if Shaw startes buying large blocks of outstanding Canwest shares.
for example if Shaw bought all the common shares and multi voting shares (not for sale), increased percentage of shares reduces purchase costs bought for the current market cap, then Shaw's cost only that.
[Shaw] put unnecessary pressure to approve the deal on the Ontario judge, said sources
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
; Atlantis shares will have to pay dividends, Canwest debt needs funds
Canwest debtholders right to complain that Canwest TV stations, first must pay back debt, before TV stations can be sold to Atlantis for shares
Quote, "The tight, seven-day window between the announcement of Shaw's bid and a court date to approve the offer put unnecessary pressure to approve the deal on the Ontario judge, said sources working with the Catalyst group. Late yesterday, sources close to Catalyst and Goldman Sachs said both players are looking at other legal actions that could derail Shaw's offer, but declined to discuss specific options."
The court hearing became heated as Shaw threatened to walk from the deal if it was not approved by midnight.
Issues for Goldman Sashs loan to Asper being a bribe, as owning Canwest shares does not pay dividends, so how will loan costs are a gift?
Quote, "After the bid was approved, Shaw revealed that its investment amounts to a minimum of $95-million in exchange for 20 per cent of the equity and an 80-per-cent voting interest in the restructured company. The competing Catalyst bid offered up $120-million for 32 per cent of the equity in a restructured CanWest."
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/shaw-wins-court-fight-for-canwest-assets/article1475436/
Shaw did not buy Canwest TV stations, as already bought by Goldman Sach's Atlantis for shares.
Quote, "The decision sets up a possible battle between Shaw and Goldman. Shaw's next step is to renegotiate a three-year deal with the New York investment bank that governs ownership of CanWest's television unit. In court, the lawyer for Goldman Sachs repeated a frequent complaint that it had been left out of the process, while Shaw argued that negotiations with Goldman were the second step after the equity arrangements were in place."
Canwest already sold TV assets, Shaw informed
Quote, "Under the terms of the sale of CanWest, Shaw has not been able to talk to Goldman. A source close to the Shaw negotiations said the time will come to negotiate with Goldman, and the company could work with them."
The Company and Goldman Sachs each acquired, for nominal consideration a 50% equityinterest in 4437691 Canada Inc., which holds interests in a number of limited partnerships.The limited partnerships include various tax shelters which acquired rights, title and interest incertain film and television programs in return for the exclusive right to distribute suchproductions for an extended period. The Company has determined 4437691 Canada Inc. is avariable interest entity and that the Company is not the primary beneficiary, accordingly theinvestment is classified as available for sale and is accounted for at cost. In accordance withits agreement with Goldman Sachs, the Company may be required to fund 50% of the entity’scash flow requirements. The Company and Goldman Sachs expect that the fundingrequirements of 4437691 Canada Inc. will be minimal and have agreed that a funding cap of$7.5 million would apply.As agreed between the Company and Goldman Sachs, the purchase price allocated tothe broadcast business was $1,183 million, including transaction costs of $55 million. TheAlliance Atlantis long term debt of $304 million was assumed by the Company andimmediately repaid. The acquisition was financed through the Company’s investment of$262 million for its 35% equity interest, Goldman Sachs’ contribution of $481 million inexchange for its puttable interest and debt financing of $767 million, net of debt issuancecosts of $23 million. CW Media, a wholly owned subsidiary of CW Investments, operatesthe acquired broadcast business which primarily consists of 18 specialty televisionchannels in Canada.The Company has, subject to regulatory approval, committed to combine its CanadianTelevision operations with CW Media operations (together being “Combined Operations”)prior to August 2011. In 2011, the Company’s and Goldman Sachs’ economic interest inthe Combined Operations will be determined based on a formula which is based on thecombined segment operating profit of CW Media and Canwest’s Canadian Televisionoperations.
Sunday, February 28, 2010
Saturday, February 27, 2010
CanWest shareholders "should directly" sell Canadian Newspaper IPOCanWest shareholders reject debt holders offer to give the Canadian newspapers to a
CanWest shareholders "should directly" sell Canadian Newspaper IPOCanWest shareholders reject debt holders offer to give the Canadian newspapers to a group for them to sell an newspaper IPO~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~http://www.thestar.com/business/companies/canwest/article/748446--let-bidding-begin-canwest-creditors-say 950million offer a joke for 100 percent of a debt free newspaper. CanWest shareholders sold the 25% of the newspapers into a trust for nearly 500 million, and placed 2 billion-plus debt attached to trust recently before;Obvious the deal for Canada benefits, with CanWest shareholder selling IPO into a debt free newspaper: covenant not to attach debt to newspapers; with capital of 200 million; and a fair matrix to disclose and expand economic transparency.Too often IPOs have been blatantly unfair to the new investors that will buy whatever, on the expectation that the nation's securities commission is looking into their best interest. Modernization of Canada. Fair IPOs. Stock market backs a fair CanWest IPONumbers. Teachers offer 500 million for 25 percent. IPO small shareholders the same. Two hundred million stays with newspaper balance sheet. Translates 800 million for CanWest and its debtors. CanWest still holds 50. And can sell later. Can sell No debt on newspaper balance sheet, covenant. And coverage will be fairer; newspapers make a profit so in era will return funds. Huge opportunity for newspaper to enter internet can compete, growth.Best deal for CanWest shareholders is for CanWest to keep the newspapers, and sell their own IPO. Recently Canwest sold 25 percent for nearly 500 million, and shuffled in more than 2 billion in debt. Not acceptable that CanWest now selling newspaper for 1 to 1.5 billionwith zero debt attached to the Canadian newspapers.
Concern when Canwest missed this interest payment, to help make this debt's notes sell at .15cents on the dollar
How could Canwest make a 30 million quarterly interest payment, that's 120 million annually, yet 8 percent debt interest on less than a billion?~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Two quotes, altered quote why. Did Canwest overstate the missed interest payment. This is thee interest payment that gave the 8% seniornotes the right to demand all their capital back. Note that Ten sale paid all outstanding interest. So this interest was paid.In March 2009, Canwest Media Inc. (“Canwest Media”) did not make an interest payment which was due on its 8% senior subordinated unsecured notes and was in default under the terms of that indenture. The guarantors of the Canwest Media debt obligations include Canwest Global, Canwest Media, Canwest Television Limited Partnership, the National Post Company and other wholly owned subsidiaries (the “Canwest Media Entities”),"In March 2009, Canwest Media did not make an interest payment of US$30.4 million which was dueon its 8% senior subordinated unsecured notes and is in default under the terms of that indenture.The guarantors under the Canwest Media debt obligations include Canwest Global, CanwestMedia, Canwest Television Limited Partnership, the National Post Company and other whollyowned subsidiaries (the “Canwest Media Entities”) but exclude Canwest (Canada) Inc., CanwestLimited Partnership and its subsidiaries including Canwest Publishing Inc., CW Investments Co.and its subsidiaries including CW Media Holdings Inc. and Ten Holdings and its subsidiaries."
'''There is no other significant CanWest acquistions.''' Plural usage misinform -- cover for the subjugation of Canada -- and the continued occupation of Canada's information disclosure matrix of those that think Canada is a colony.True cause of CanWest's financial toll. CanWest bought Canada's flagship newspapers in a vendor financing deal (semi arms length transaction, designed to fail) and now CanWest is under repo from this debt; debt had balance sheet covenants that restricted CanWest. The abnormal high interest rate of 12 1/8%interest rate; and forced putting of the Canadian dollar by the Canadian newspaper monopoly, took its toll.Name the other acquisition besides Goldman Sachs? Curious how Goldman Sachs acquisition finished CanWest as CanWest is yet to buy 2/3 of Goldman Sachs Canadian TV network; Goldman Sachs has the right to sell Atlantis TV network to CanWest, in a long term put. If not exercised, is a much smaller transaction. Define fact, that '''CanWest's agreement to give Goldman a long term put to sell this billion dollar asset to CanWest is not regular and has placed CanWest balance sheet in limbo.''''''Name the other acquisition??''' besides CanWest's one/third acquisition of Goldman Sachs' Canadian TV network.
Two quotes, altered quote why. Did Canwest overstate the missed interest payment. This is thee interest payment that gave the 8% seniornotes the right to demand all their capital back. Note that Ten sale paid all outstanding interest. So this interest was paid.In March 2009, Canwest Media Inc. (“Canwest Media”) did not make an interest payment which was due on its 8% senior subordinated unsecured notes and was in default under the terms of that indenture. The guarantors of the Canwest Media debt obligations include Canwest Global, Canwest Media, Canwest Television Limited Partnership, the National Post Company and other wholly owned subsidiaries (the “Canwest Media Entities”),"In March 2009, Canwest Media did not make an interest payment of US$30.4 million which was dueon its 8% senior subordinated unsecured notes and is in default under the terms of that indenture.The guarantors under the Canwest Media debt obligations include Canwest Global, CanwestMedia, Canwest Television Limited Partnership, the National Post Company and other whollyowned subsidiaries (the “Canwest Media Entities”) but exclude Canwest (Canada) Inc., CanwestLimited Partnership and its subsidiaries including Canwest Publishing Inc., CW Investments Co.and its subsidiaries including CW Media Holdings Inc. and Ten Holdings and its subsidiaries."
'''There is no other significant CanWest acquistions.''' Plural usage misinform -- cover for the subjugation of Canada -- and the continued occupation of Canada's information disclosure matrix of those that think Canada is a colony.True cause of CanWest's financial toll. CanWest bought Canada's flagship newspapers in a vendor financing deal (semi arms length transaction, designed to fail) and now CanWest is under repo from this debt; debt had balance sheet covenants that restricted CanWest. The abnormal high interest rate of 12 1/8%interest rate; and forced putting of the Canadian dollar by the Canadian newspaper monopoly, took its toll.Name the other acquisition besides Goldman Sachs? Curious how Goldman Sachs acquisition finished CanWest as CanWest is yet to buy 2/3 of Goldman Sachs Canadian TV network; Goldman Sachs has the right to sell Atlantis TV network to CanWest, in a long term put. If not exercised, is a much smaller transaction. Define fact, that '''CanWest's agreement to give Goldman a long term put to sell this billion dollar asset to CanWest is not regular and has placed CanWest balance sheet in limbo.''''''Name the other acquisition??''' besides CanWest's one/third acquisition of Goldman Sachs' Canadian TV network.
Friday, February 26, 2010
CanWest buys bonds dollar for dollar, bonds that were sold for 15 cents
8%noteholders are making too much, in their investment controlling Canada's news
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[Canwest buying dollar for dollar bonds sold at 15 cents, is fraud. CanWest not biding on these bonds is fraud.]
CanWest 8%noteholders are making nearly 700 pecent on bonds bought at .15 cents, and nearly 50 percent for the 8% interest rate -- combined with that these some of these notes are being turned into shares, so when Canwest recovers are worth maybe 30-40 times on the investment, plus dividends, and acces to control Canada's media.
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[Canwest buying dollar for dollar bonds sold at 15 cents, is fraud. CanWest not biding on these bonds is fraud.]
CanWest 8%noteholders are making nearly 700 pecent on bonds bought at .15 cents, and nearly 50 percent for the 8% interest rate -- combined with that these some of these notes are being turned into shares, so when Canwest recovers are worth maybe 30-40 times on the investment, plus dividends, and acces to control Canada's media.
Tuesday, February 23, 2010
Money Laundering, buying a string of money losing swaps: 8% Ad Hoc committee are liable for previous noteholders pilfering Canwest Treasury
Only in 2007, did Canada's newspapers have a hedging profit of 16 million. Very little press on this Canwest failure. Where did these funds go? International audit.
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Interest rate and foreign currency swap losses
(-110,860 lost 04) ( -23,015 lost in 03 )
Interest rate and foreign currency swap losses
(-138,639 lost 06 ) ( -121,064 lost in 05)
Interest rate and foreign currency swap losses
(+15,955 made 07) (-138,639 lost in 06)
Interest rate and foreigh currency swap losses
(-150 million lost in 09) (-54 million lost in 08 )
[Irregularities. Swaps only for some of debt, so a 150 million loss approachs the amount of interest that debt costs, should not be so. Canadian and Austrialian dollar rose, and some debt in these currencies, so should be good for Canwest. New rounds of Hedging contracts, so why not a better deal. Should win also. ]
Issues did CanWest buy derivatives, or issue them. Name the Canadian company on the other side of the transaction currency swap. 8% Ad hoc group the supplier of hedging products, stinks.
Accounting for derivative instruments and hedging activities. Under U.S. GAAP, entities are required to recognize all derivative instruments as either assets or liabilities in the balance sheet, and measure those instruments at fair value. The changes in fair value of the derivative are included either in the statement of earnings or other comprehensive Under Canadian GAAP hedging derivatives are eligible for hedge accounting if certain criteria are met. Non-hedging derivatives are recognized at their fair value as either assets or liabilities.
not in 02 01
Proposed accounting policies
Foreign currency translation and hedging relationships
In November 2001, the Accounting Standards Board of the CICA approved amendments to Handbook Section 1650, Foreign Currency Translation, and a new accounting Guideline, Hedging Relationships. The amendments to Section 1650, applicable for the Company in fiscal 2003 with retroactive application, eliminate the deferral and amortization method for unrealized translation gains and losses on non-current monetary assets and liabilities and require the disclosure of exchange gains and losses included in net income. The Guideline, applicable for the Company in fiscal 2004, deals with the identification, documentation and designation and effectiveness
Under its Senior Secured Credit facility, the Company is required to maintain a fair
value of its interest rate swaps and foreign currency and interest rate swaps above
a prescribed minimum liability ($500 million as at August 31, 2004, increased to
$600 million subsequent to year end). There are also prescribed minimum liabilities
with individual counterparties, which have two-way recouponing provisions. The
Company was required to make net recouponing payments of $28.0 million during
2004 (2003–$3.0 million).
Further strengthening of the Canadian currency and/or
declining interest rates may result in further payments to counterparties.
The Company is subject to covenants under certain of the credit facilities referred
to above, including thresholds for leverage and interest coverage, and is also subject
to certain restrictions under negative covenants.
Principal payments of long-term debt, based on terms existing at August 31, 2004
over the next five years, are:
Year ending August 31, 2005 31,712
2006 9,726
2007 10,671
2008 10,546
2009 921,583
Hedging Relationships
The Company adopted CICA Accounting
Guideline 13, “Hedging Relationships,”
effective September 1, 2003. In accordance
with the new policy, the Company’s
hedging relationships are documented
and subject to effectiveness tests on a
quarterly basis for reasonable assurance
that they are and will continue to be
effective. The adoption of this guideline
had no impact on the financial statements.
8. INTEREST RATE AND FOREI GN CURENCY SWAP LIABILITIES
The Company has interest rate swaps and foreign currency interest rate swaps for
which it has not utilized hedge accounting or where the underlying debt has been extinguished
early. T he Company records these swaps at their fair value at each balance
sheet date. Changes in the fair value are charged or credited to earnings as interest rate
and foreign currency swap (gains) losses. T he following are the key terms and the fair
value of each swap. Certain swaps contracts with the same terms have been grouped.
For the year ended A ugust 31, 2007 the Company recorded net interest rate and
foreign currency swap gains of $16.0 million (2006 – losses of $138.6 million).
Interest 2007 Interest 2006
Rate (1) Rate (1)
Senior secured credit facility (2) – – 7.3% 422,249
Senior unsecured notes (3) – – 7.6% 277
Senior subordinated notes (4) 8.7% 829,800 8.5% 872,031
CanWest MediaWorks Limited Partnership
Secured Credit Facility (5) – – 5.3% 825,000
CanWest MediaWorks Limited Partnership
Secured Credit Facilities (6) 7.1% 841,170 – –
CanWest MediaWorks Limited Partnership
senior unsecured notes (7) 9.1% 75,000 – –
CanWest MediaWorks Limited Partnership
senior subordinated notes (8) 9.1% 422,480 – –
CW Media Holdings Inc. senior credit facility (9) 8.7% 471,518 – –
CW Media Holdings Inc. senior unsecured notes (10) 12.6% 315,429 – –
Bank loan AUS$245,000
(2006 – AUS$170,000) (11) 7.2% 211,043 6.6% 143,514
Senior unsecured notes US$125,000
(2006 – US$125,000) (12) 7.7% 132,050 7.2% 138,320
Senior notes AUS$150,000
(2006 – AUS$150,000) (13) 7.1% 129,210 6.8% 126,630
Other 3.0% 4,250 3.0% 4,250
3,431,950 2,532,271
Effect of foreign currency swap 170,757 104,937
Long-term debt 3,602,707 2,637,208
Less portion due within one year (12,760) (4,250)
Long-term portion 3,589,947 2,632,958
7. LON G-TERM DEBT
Notional Fair Notional Fair
Amount Value Amount Value
as at as at as at as at
Type of swap Maturity Aug. 31, 2007 Aug. 31, 2007 Aug. 31, 2006 Aug. 31, 2006
Floating to fixed
interest rate swaps November 2006 – – 50,000 237
Floating to fixed
interest rate swaps Various to August 2009 46,803 1,484 47,285 2,933
Floating to fixed
interest rate swaps November 2009 250,000 11,104 250,000 19,714
Floating to fixed
interest rate swaps Various to December 2014 219,657 (4,641) 219,492 (2,656)
(AUS$255,000) (AUS$5,375) (AUS$260,000) (AUS$3,147)
Floating to fixed foreign
currency swap Various to August 2009 514,828 139,348 520,135 119,288
Total net fair value 147,295 139,516
The total fair value is recorded on the
balance sheet as follows:
Total liabilities 151,936 142,172
Total assets (4,641) (2,656)
Total fair value 147,295 139,516
Interest rate and foreign currency swap losses (note 8) 15,955 (07) (138,639)
The changes in fair value of fair value
hedging derivatives will be recorded in the
income statement with a corresponding
gain or loss on the re-measurement of the
hedged item attributable to the hedge risk.
The impact of the hedging derivatives on
September 1, 2007 will be recognized in
opening deficit, and opening accumulated
other comprehensive earnings, as appropriate.
T he impact of the hedging derivatives
on the consolidated financial statements
on September 1, 2007 is estimated
to be a decrease in derivative instruments
of approximately $30.9 million, with a
corresponding decrease in opening accumulated
comprehensive earnings, net of
income taxes of approximately $10.0 million.
We have determined that there is no
material effect on retained earnings.
We are still evaluating the allowable
alternatives under the new standards on
the treatment of transactions costs directly
attributable to financial assets and
liabilities and as such we have not made a
INTEREST RATE AND FOREIGN CURRENCY SWAP LIABILITIES
The Company has entered into interest rate swaps and foreign currency interest rate swaps for
which it has not utilized hedge accounting as a result of the early extinguishments of the related
debt obligations. The Company records these swaps at their fair value at each balance sheet
date. Changes in the fair value is charged or credited to earnings as interest rate and foreign
currency swap losses. The following are the key terms and the fair value of each swap. Certain
swaps contracts with the same terms have been grouped.
Type of swap
Maturity
Notional
amount as at
Aug. 31, 2006
Fair Value
as at
Aug. 31, 2006
Notional
Amount
as at
Aug. 31, 2005
Fair value
as at
Aug. 31, 2005
Floating to fixed
interest rate
swaps
November
2006
50,000
237
150,000
2,265
Floating to fixed
interest rate
swaps
Various to
August 2009
47,285
2,933
32,764
3,494
Floating to fixed
interest rate
swaps
November
2009
250,000
19,714
250,000
32,129
Floating to fixed
interest rate
swaps
Various to
December
2014
219,492
(AUS$260,000)
(2,656)
(AUS$3,147)
254,490
(AUS$285,000)
2,264
(AUS 2,534)
Floating to fixed
foreign currency
swap
Various to
August 2009
520,135
119,288
618,559
174,923
Total net fair value 139,516 215,075
The total fair value is recorded on the balance sheet as follows:
Total liabilities 142,172 215,075
Total assets (2,656) -
Total fair value 139,516 215,075
Interest rate and foreign currency swap losses (note 8) (138,639) 06 (121,064) 05
Accounting for derivative instruments and hedging activities
Under U.S. GAAP, entities are required to recognize all derivative instruments as either
assets or liabilities in the balance sheet, and measure those instruments at fair value. The
changes in fair value of the derivatives are included in the statement of earnings. Under
Canadian GAAP hedge accounting is applied for derivatives that are eligible for hedge
accounting if certain criteria are met and non-hedging derivatives are recognized at their fair
value as either assets or liabilities. As a result of adopting FAS 133 on September 1, 2001,
the Company discontinued hedge accounting. The fair values of derivatives designated as
hedges before August 31, 2000 have been included in a transitional adjustment and are
included in income over the term of the hedged transaction. The U.S. GAAP reconciliation
reflects the recording of losses on interest rate and cross-currency swaps of: 2006 - $19,771
(2005 – gain of $3,315), with related tax recoveries of: 2006 - $7,920 (2005 – provision of
$18,624). The balance sheet effect was to increase long term swap liabilities by: 2006 -
$85,055 (2005 - $65,776), reduce future tax liabilities by: 2006 - $27,729 (2005 - $19,981)
and decrease minority interest by: 2006 - $1,525 (2005 – $1,393), and reduce shareholders’
equity by: 2006 - $55,801 (2005 - $44,402).
Proposed accounting policies
The Accounting Standards Board of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Canada issued
CICA 3855, Financial Instruments - Recognition and Measurement, CICA 3865, Hedges, and
CICA 1530, Comprehensive Income, which will be applied by the Company for its fiscal years
beginning on September 1, 2007. CICA 3855 prescribes when a financial asset, financial
liability, or non-financial derivative is to be recognized on the balance sheet and the
measurement of such amount. It also specifies how financial instrument gains and losses are to
be presented. CICA 3865 is applicable for designated hedging relationships and builds on
existing Canadian GAAP guidance by specifying how hedge accounting is applied and what
disclosures are necessary when it is applied. CICA 1530 introduces new standards for the
presentation and disclosure of components of comprehensive income. Comprehensive income
is defined as the change in net assets of an enterprise during a reporting period from
transactions and other events and circumstances from non-owner sources. It includes all
changes in net assets during a period except those resulting from investments by owners and
distributions to owners. The Company is currently considering the impacts of the adoption of
such standards.
2,561,795 Canwest debt as nov 29
Hedging Derivative Instruments
During 2009, Canwest Media settled hedging derivative instrument related to its senior subordinated notes and received
cash proceeds of $104.8 million.
As a result of the failure to pay amounts due under the hedging derivative instruments, Canwest Limited Partnership was in
default of the terms of the hedging derivative instruments and the counterparties terminated the hedging arrangements
and demanded payment of Canwest Limited Partnership’s net obligations under those arrangements in the aggregate
amount of $68.9 million. Canwest Limited Partnership has not satisfied the demand for payment and has recorded this obligation
at its amortized cost in accounts payable and accrued liabilities accruing interest at the counterparty’s cost of funds
plus a margin. The liability is secured by substantially all the assets of Canwest Limited Partnership.
p32 annual report09
Revenue 2,867,459 3,126,582
Operating expenses 2,405,452 2,554,622
Restructuring expenses (note 8) 72,158 20,715
Broadcast rights write-downs 48,756 -
Retirement plan curtailment expense (note 24) 31,327 -
309,766 551,245
Amortization of intangible assets 7,978 9,040
Amortization of property and equipment 104,590 113,539
Other amortization 412 379
As at August 31, 2009, including the impact of the hedging derivative instruments, the Company holds $1,329.4 million
(2008 - $1,613.9 million) of debt subject to cash flow interest rate risk and $2,200.6 million (2008 - $1,861.1 million) of debt
subject to fair value interest rate risk.
Cash Flow Interest Rate Risk
As at August 31, 2009, if interest rates on long-term debt had been 10 basis points higher or lower with all other variables
held constant, after tax net earnings (loss) for the year would have been $0.8 million (2008 - $1.3 million) higher or lower,
respectively, as a result of higher or lower interest expense on long-term debt, including the effect of the foreign currency
and interest rate swap.
Fair Value Interest Rate Risk
As at August 31, 2009, assuming all other variables are held constant, a 25 basis point parallel shift in the Canadian and US
fixed yield curve would have resulted in a $6.7 million (2008 - $9.3 million) change in the fair value of the swap and no
change in the fair value of the long-term debt.
he Company has entered into an interest rate swap in the notional amount of $250 million to fix the interest payments on this revolving facility and subsequent
revolving facilities until November 2009, resulting in an effective interest rate of 6.7% plus a margin. As a result of debt repayments, a notional amount of $250
million (2003– nil) was overhanging as at August 31, 2004 (2003–nil) and its fair value was recognized in earnings. The Company has entered into an interest rate
swap to fix the interest payments on its Canadian dollar term loans, until maturity, with a notional value of $278.3 million (2003–$338.8 million), resulting in
an effective interest rate of 6.3% plus a margin. As a result of debt repayments, a notional amount of $256.5 million was overhanging as at August 31, 2004
(2003–$174.9 million) and its fair value was recognized in earnings. The Company has also entered into a cross-currency interest rate swap to fix its payments on
its U.S. dollar term loans, until maturity, with a notional value of $1,061.5 million (2003–$1,072.5 million), resulting in an effective interest rate of 6.4% plus a
margin and a fixed currency exchange rate of US$1:$1.5485. As a result of debt repayments, a notional amount of $305.0 million was overhanging as at August
31, 2004 (2003–$67.9 million) and its fair value was recognized in earnings. For the year ended August 31, 2004, total overhanging swap losses of $110.9 million
(2003–$23.0 million) were charged to earnings. The resulting overhanging swap liability as at August 31, 2004 was $120.3 million (2003–$24.6 million).
3 The US$200.0 million senior unsecured notes mature on April 3, 2013 and bear interest at 7.625%. The notes are redeemable at the Company’s option, in whole at
any time or in part from time to time, on or after April 15, 2008. The Company has entered into a US$200 million cross-currency interest rate swap resulting in floating
interest rates on its senior unsecured notes at interest rates based on CDOR plus a margin and a fixed currency exchange rate of US$1:$1.4735 until May 2013.
4 The senior subordinated notes include loans of US$425.0 million and loans held by the majority shareholder of the Company in the amount of US$41.9 million
(2003–US$41.9 million) which mature on May 15, 2011 and bear interest at 10.625%. The notes rank junior to the Company’s senior credit facility and are
guaranteed by certain subsidiaries of the Company. The notes are redeemable at the Company’s option, in whole at any time or in part from time to time,
on or after May 15, 2006. The Company has entered into a US$425 million cross-currency interest rate swap resulting in floating interest rates on its senior subordinated notes at interest rates based on CDOR plus a margin and a fixed currency exchange rate of US$1:$1.5505.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Interest rate and foreign currency swap losses
(-110,860 lost 04) ( -23,015 lost in 03 )
Interest rate and foreign currency swap losses
(-138,639 lost 06 ) ( -121,064 lost in 05)
Interest rate and foreign currency swap losses
(+15,955 made 07) (-138,639 lost in 06)
Interest rate and foreigh currency swap losses
(-150 million lost in 09) (-54 million lost in 08 )
[Irregularities. Swaps only for some of debt, so a 150 million loss approachs the amount of interest that debt costs, should not be so. Canadian and Austrialian dollar rose, and some debt in these currencies, so should be good for Canwest. New rounds of Hedging contracts, so why not a better deal. Should win also. ]
Issues did CanWest buy derivatives, or issue them. Name the Canadian company on the other side of the transaction currency swap. 8% Ad hoc group the supplier of hedging products, stinks.
Accounting for derivative instruments and hedging activities. Under U.S. GAAP, entities are required to recognize all derivative instruments as either assets or liabilities in the balance sheet, and measure those instruments at fair value. The changes in fair value of the derivative are included either in the statement of earnings or other comprehensive Under Canadian GAAP hedging derivatives are eligible for hedge accounting if certain criteria are met. Non-hedging derivatives are recognized at their fair value as either assets or liabilities.
not in 02 01
Proposed accounting policies
Foreign currency translation and hedging relationships
In November 2001, the Accounting Standards Board of the CICA approved amendments to Handbook Section 1650, Foreign Currency Translation, and a new accounting Guideline, Hedging Relationships. The amendments to Section 1650, applicable for the Company in fiscal 2003 with retroactive application, eliminate the deferral and amortization method for unrealized translation gains and losses on non-current monetary assets and liabilities and require the disclosure of exchange gains and losses included in net income. The Guideline, applicable for the Company in fiscal 2004, deals with the identification, documentation and designation and effectiveness
Under its Senior Secured Credit facility, the Company is required to maintain a fair
value of its interest rate swaps and foreign currency and interest rate swaps above
a prescribed minimum liability ($500 million as at August 31, 2004, increased to
$600 million subsequent to year end). There are also prescribed minimum liabilities
with individual counterparties, which have two-way recouponing provisions. The
Company was required to make net recouponing payments of $28.0 million during
2004 (2003–$3.0 million).
Further strengthening of the Canadian currency and/or
declining interest rates may result in further payments to counterparties.
The Company is subject to covenants under certain of the credit facilities referred
to above, including thresholds for leverage and interest coverage, and is also subject
to certain restrictions under negative covenants.
Principal payments of long-term debt, based on terms existing at August 31, 2004
over the next five years, are:
Year ending August 31, 2005 31,712
2006 9,726
2007 10,671
2008 10,546
2009 921,583
Hedging Relationships
The Company adopted CICA Accounting
Guideline 13, “Hedging Relationships,”
effective September 1, 2003. In accordance
with the new policy, the Company’s
hedging relationships are documented
and subject to effectiveness tests on a
quarterly basis for reasonable assurance
that they are and will continue to be
effective. The adoption of this guideline
had no impact on the financial statements.
8. INTEREST RATE AND FOREI GN CURENCY SWAP LIABILITIES
The Company has interest rate swaps and foreign currency interest rate swaps for
which it has not utilized hedge accounting or where the underlying debt has been extinguished
early. T he Company records these swaps at their fair value at each balance
sheet date. Changes in the fair value are charged or credited to earnings as interest rate
and foreign currency swap (gains) losses. T he following are the key terms and the fair
value of each swap. Certain swaps contracts with the same terms have been grouped.
For the year ended A ugust 31, 2007 the Company recorded net interest rate and
foreign currency swap gains of $16.0 million (2006 – losses of $138.6 million).
Interest 2007 Interest 2006
Rate (1) Rate (1)
Senior secured credit facility (2) – – 7.3% 422,249
Senior unsecured notes (3) – – 7.6% 277
Senior subordinated notes (4) 8.7% 829,800 8.5% 872,031
CanWest MediaWorks Limited Partnership
Secured Credit Facility (5) – – 5.3% 825,000
CanWest MediaWorks Limited Partnership
Secured Credit Facilities (6) 7.1% 841,170 – –
CanWest MediaWorks Limited Partnership
senior unsecured notes (7) 9.1% 75,000 – –
CanWest MediaWorks Limited Partnership
senior subordinated notes (8) 9.1% 422,480 – –
CW Media Holdings Inc. senior credit facility (9) 8.7% 471,518 – –
CW Media Holdings Inc. senior unsecured notes (10) 12.6% 315,429 – –
Bank loan AUS$245,000
(2006 – AUS$170,000) (11) 7.2% 211,043 6.6% 143,514
Senior unsecured notes US$125,000
(2006 – US$125,000) (12) 7.7% 132,050 7.2% 138,320
Senior notes AUS$150,000
(2006 – AUS$150,000) (13) 7.1% 129,210 6.8% 126,630
Other 3.0% 4,250 3.0% 4,250
3,431,950 2,532,271
Effect of foreign currency swap 170,757 104,937
Long-term debt 3,602,707 2,637,208
Less portion due within one year (12,760) (4,250)
Long-term portion 3,589,947 2,632,958
7. LON G-TERM DEBT
Notional Fair Notional Fair
Amount Value Amount Value
as at as at as at as at
Type of swap Maturity Aug. 31, 2007 Aug. 31, 2007 Aug. 31, 2006 Aug. 31, 2006
Floating to fixed
interest rate swaps November 2006 – – 50,000 237
Floating to fixed
interest rate swaps Various to August 2009 46,803 1,484 47,285 2,933
Floating to fixed
interest rate swaps November 2009 250,000 11,104 250,000 19,714
Floating to fixed
interest rate swaps Various to December 2014 219,657 (4,641) 219,492 (2,656)
(AUS$255,000) (AUS$5,375) (AUS$260,000) (AUS$3,147)
Floating to fixed foreign
currency swap Various to August 2009 514,828 139,348 520,135 119,288
Total net fair value 147,295 139,516
The total fair value is recorded on the
balance sheet as follows:
Total liabilities 151,936 142,172
Total assets (4,641) (2,656)
Total fair value 147,295 139,516
Interest rate and foreign currency swap losses (note 8) 15,955 (07) (138,639)
The changes in fair value of fair value
hedging derivatives will be recorded in the
income statement with a corresponding
gain or loss on the re-measurement of the
hedged item attributable to the hedge risk.
The impact of the hedging derivatives on
September 1, 2007 will be recognized in
opening deficit, and opening accumulated
other comprehensive earnings, as appropriate.
T he impact of the hedging derivatives
on the consolidated financial statements
on September 1, 2007 is estimated
to be a decrease in derivative instruments
of approximately $30.9 million, with a
corresponding decrease in opening accumulated
comprehensive earnings, net of
income taxes of approximately $10.0 million.
We have determined that there is no
material effect on retained earnings.
We are still evaluating the allowable
alternatives under the new standards on
the treatment of transactions costs directly
attributable to financial assets and
liabilities and as such we have not made a
INTEREST RATE AND FOREIGN CURRENCY SWAP LIABILITIES
The Company has entered into interest rate swaps and foreign currency interest rate swaps for
which it has not utilized hedge accounting as a result of the early extinguishments of the related
debt obligations. The Company records these swaps at their fair value at each balance sheet
date. Changes in the fair value is charged or credited to earnings as interest rate and foreign
currency swap losses. The following are the key terms and the fair value of each swap. Certain
swaps contracts with the same terms have been grouped.
Type of swap
Maturity
Notional
amount as at
Aug. 31, 2006
Fair Value
as at
Aug. 31, 2006
Notional
Amount
as at
Aug. 31, 2005
Fair value
as at
Aug. 31, 2005
Floating to fixed
interest rate
swaps
November
2006
50,000
237
150,000
2,265
Floating to fixed
interest rate
swaps
Various to
August 2009
47,285
2,933
32,764
3,494
Floating to fixed
interest rate
swaps
November
2009
250,000
19,714
250,000
32,129
Floating to fixed
interest rate
swaps
Various to
December
2014
219,492
(AUS$260,000)
(2,656)
(AUS$3,147)
254,490
(AUS$285,000)
2,264
(AUS 2,534)
Floating to fixed
foreign currency
swap
Various to
August 2009
520,135
119,288
618,559
174,923
Total net fair value 139,516 215,075
The total fair value is recorded on the balance sheet as follows:
Total liabilities 142,172 215,075
Total assets (2,656) -
Total fair value 139,516 215,075
Interest rate and foreign currency swap losses (note 8) (138,639) 06 (121,064) 05
Accounting for derivative instruments and hedging activities
Under U.S. GAAP, entities are required to recognize all derivative instruments as either
assets or liabilities in the balance sheet, and measure those instruments at fair value. The
changes in fair value of the derivatives are included in the statement of earnings. Under
Canadian GAAP hedge accounting is applied for derivatives that are eligible for hedge
accounting if certain criteria are met and non-hedging derivatives are recognized at their fair
value as either assets or liabilities. As a result of adopting FAS 133 on September 1, 2001,
the Company discontinued hedge accounting. The fair values of derivatives designated as
hedges before August 31, 2000 have been included in a transitional adjustment and are
included in income over the term of the hedged transaction. The U.S. GAAP reconciliation
reflects the recording of losses on interest rate and cross-currency swaps of: 2006 - $19,771
(2005 – gain of $3,315), with related tax recoveries of: 2006 - $7,920 (2005 – provision of
$18,624). The balance sheet effect was to increase long term swap liabilities by: 2006 -
$85,055 (2005 - $65,776), reduce future tax liabilities by: 2006 - $27,729 (2005 - $19,981)
and decrease minority interest by: 2006 - $1,525 (2005 – $1,393), and reduce shareholders’
equity by: 2006 - $55,801 (2005 - $44,402).
Proposed accounting policies
The Accounting Standards Board of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Canada issued
CICA 3855, Financial Instruments - Recognition and Measurement, CICA 3865, Hedges, and
CICA 1530, Comprehensive Income, which will be applied by the Company for its fiscal years
beginning on September 1, 2007. CICA 3855 prescribes when a financial asset, financial
liability, or non-financial derivative is to be recognized on the balance sheet and the
measurement of such amount. It also specifies how financial instrument gains and losses are to
be presented. CICA 3865 is applicable for designated hedging relationships and builds on
existing Canadian GAAP guidance by specifying how hedge accounting is applied and what
disclosures are necessary when it is applied. CICA 1530 introduces new standards for the
presentation and disclosure of components of comprehensive income. Comprehensive income
is defined as the change in net assets of an enterprise during a reporting period from
transactions and other events and circumstances from non-owner sources. It includes all
changes in net assets during a period except those resulting from investments by owners and
distributions to owners. The Company is currently considering the impacts of the adoption of
such standards.
2,561,795 Canwest debt as nov 29
Hedging Derivative Instruments
During 2009, Canwest Media settled hedging derivative instrument related to its senior subordinated notes and received
cash proceeds of $104.8 million.
As a result of the failure to pay amounts due under the hedging derivative instruments, Canwest Limited Partnership was in
default of the terms of the hedging derivative instruments and the counterparties terminated the hedging arrangements
and demanded payment of Canwest Limited Partnership’s net obligations under those arrangements in the aggregate
amount of $68.9 million. Canwest Limited Partnership has not satisfied the demand for payment and has recorded this obligation
at its amortized cost in accounts payable and accrued liabilities accruing interest at the counterparty’s cost of funds
plus a margin. The liability is secured by substantially all the assets of Canwest Limited Partnership.
p32 annual report09
Revenue 2,867,459 3,126,582
Operating expenses 2,405,452 2,554,622
Restructuring expenses (note 8) 72,158 20,715
Broadcast rights write-downs 48,756 -
Retirement plan curtailment expense (note 24) 31,327 -
309,766 551,245
Amortization of intangible assets 7,978 9,040
Amortization of property and equipment 104,590 113,539
Other amortization 412 379
As at August 31, 2009, including the impact of the hedging derivative instruments, the Company holds $1,329.4 million
(2008 - $1,613.9 million) of debt subject to cash flow interest rate risk and $2,200.6 million (2008 - $1,861.1 million) of debt
subject to fair value interest rate risk.
Cash Flow Interest Rate Risk
As at August 31, 2009, if interest rates on long-term debt had been 10 basis points higher or lower with all other variables
held constant, after tax net earnings (loss) for the year would have been $0.8 million (2008 - $1.3 million) higher or lower,
respectively, as a result of higher or lower interest expense on long-term debt, including the effect of the foreign currency
and interest rate swap.
Fair Value Interest Rate Risk
As at August 31, 2009, assuming all other variables are held constant, a 25 basis point parallel shift in the Canadian and US
fixed yield curve would have resulted in a $6.7 million (2008 - $9.3 million) change in the fair value of the swap and no
change in the fair value of the long-term debt.
he Company has entered into an interest rate swap in the notional amount of $250 million to fix the interest payments on this revolving facility and subsequent
revolving facilities until November 2009, resulting in an effective interest rate of 6.7% plus a margin. As a result of debt repayments, a notional amount of $250
million (2003– nil) was overhanging as at August 31, 2004 (2003–nil) and its fair value was recognized in earnings. The Company has entered into an interest rate
swap to fix the interest payments on its Canadian dollar term loans, until maturity, with a notional value of $278.3 million (2003–$338.8 million), resulting in
an effective interest rate of 6.3% plus a margin. As a result of debt repayments, a notional amount of $256.5 million was overhanging as at August 31, 2004
(2003–$174.9 million) and its fair value was recognized in earnings. The Company has also entered into a cross-currency interest rate swap to fix its payments on
its U.S. dollar term loans, until maturity, with a notional value of $1,061.5 million (2003–$1,072.5 million), resulting in an effective interest rate of 6.4% plus a
margin and a fixed currency exchange rate of US$1:$1.5485. As a result of debt repayments, a notional amount of $305.0 million was overhanging as at August
31, 2004 (2003–$67.9 million) and its fair value was recognized in earnings. For the year ended August 31, 2004, total overhanging swap losses of $110.9 million
(2003–$23.0 million) were charged to earnings. The resulting overhanging swap liability as at August 31, 2004 was $120.3 million (2003–$24.6 million).
3 The US$200.0 million senior unsecured notes mature on April 3, 2013 and bear interest at 7.625%. The notes are redeemable at the Company’s option, in whole at
any time or in part from time to time, on or after April 15, 2008. The Company has entered into a US$200 million cross-currency interest rate swap resulting in floating
interest rates on its senior unsecured notes at interest rates based on CDOR plus a margin and a fixed currency exchange rate of US$1:$1.4735 until May 2013.
4 The senior subordinated notes include loans of US$425.0 million and loans held by the majority shareholder of the Company in the amount of US$41.9 million
(2003–US$41.9 million) which mature on May 15, 2011 and bear interest at 10.625%. The notes rank junior to the Company’s senior credit facility and are
guaranteed by certain subsidiaries of the Company. The notes are redeemable at the Company’s option, in whole at any time or in part from time to time,
on or after May 15, 2006. The Company has entered into a US$425 million cross-currency interest rate swap resulting in floating interest rates on its senior subordinated notes at interest rates based on CDOR plus a margin and a fixed currency exchange rate of US$1:$1.5505.
New way to extract electricity from Natural Gas
Bloom box is, Quote, "A solid oxide regenerative fuel cell system [that] is used to supply power in a fuel cell mode and to generate metabolic oxygen and a hydrocarbon fuel reserve in an electrolysis mode."
http://www.bloomenergy.com/
Upclose look
http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-Parser?Sect1=PTO1&Sect2=HITOFF&d=PALL&p=1&u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsrchnum.htm&r=1&f=G&l=50&s1=7572530.PN.&OS=PN/7572530&RS=PN/7572530
http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/patog/week06/OG/html/1351-2/US07658755-20100209.html
http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/patog/week06/OG/patentee/alphaR.htm
Quote, "The 5-kilowatt device involves a fuel cell system that can generate electricity using a range of liquid fuels, such as natural gas or ethanol. Installed at the University of Tennessee in Chattanooga in 2006, one of the earliest Bloom box units (running on natural gas) to deliver enough power at twice the efficiency of a standard gas-burning boiler system, with 60 percent fewer emissions."
http://brainstormtech.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2010/02/19/is-k-r-sridhars-magic-box-ready-for-prime-time/
http://www.csmonitor.com/Innovation/Horizons/2010/0222/Bloom-Box-What-60-Minutes-left-out
http://www.nanotech-now.com/news.cgi?story_id=36880
http://www.bloomenergy.com/
Upclose look
http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-Parser?Sect1=PTO1&Sect2=HITOFF&d=PALL&p=1&u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsrchnum.htm&r=1&f=G&l=50&s1=7572530.PN.&OS=PN/7572530&RS=PN/7572530
http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/patog/week06/OG/html/1351-2/US07658755-20100209.html
http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/patog/week06/OG/patentee/alphaR.htm
Quote, "The 5-kilowatt device involves a fuel cell system that can generate electricity using a range of liquid fuels, such as natural gas or ethanol. Installed at the University of Tennessee in Chattanooga in 2006, one of the earliest Bloom box units (running on natural gas) to deliver enough power at twice the efficiency of a standard gas-burning boiler system, with 60 percent fewer emissions."
http://brainstormtech.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2010/02/19/is-k-r-sridhars-magic-box-ready-for-prime-time/
http://www.csmonitor.com/Innovation/Horizons/2010/0222/Bloom-Box-What-60-Minutes-left-out
http://www.nanotech-now.com/news.cgi?story_id=36880
Monday, February 22, 2010
CanWest newspaper monopoly, sold to foreign hedge fund financing a local buyer,adds more than a million a week onto newspaper company's interest costs
Canada's banks financing the one billion newspaper sale price at a 4 percent interest rate, is a 40 million annual interest cost
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Buyers fronting for a foreign hedge funds, and borrowing abroad at higher interest rate of 8 to 9 percent, adds more than a million a week onto Canada's newspapers interest costs. Nor does Revenue Canada earn taxes on foreign debt interest expenses. Revenue Canada prefers that Canadian banks financing the one billion newspaper sale price, with the lower 4 percent loan.
There is a concern, the new buyer will just add new debt and sell Canada's flagship newspapers into a debt mill IPO. Issues of corruption, and fair disclosure, when newspaper monopoly disclosure matrix controlled by one group. Best choice to up hold the right is to support a news reporter-employee, acquisition of Canada's pay-subscription newspaper monopoly, into a non profit. Newspaper widget fair, honest reporting is key to modern economy, and the Bank of Canada. Benefits the nation to have neutral newspapers, as much as that is possible.
In the financial storm of 2009, CanWest newspaper publishing 09 operating profit is 177 million. 08 operating profit 295 million. Newspapers publishing 1.1 billion revenue(09), and 1.3billion revenue in(08). Actual operating profit more than reported, as Canwest include extras minused into operating profit. Concern, the newspapers in bankrupcy protection will interfer with the short term results, newspapers still very profitable. http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/canwest-chain-leaves-300-creditors-unpaid/article1431891/
http://www.canada.com/business/fp/Bids+Canwest+papers+begin+take+shape/2457406/story.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Buyers fronting for a foreign hedge funds, and borrowing abroad at higher interest rate of 8 to 9 percent, adds more than a million a week onto Canada's newspapers interest costs. Nor does Revenue Canada earn taxes on foreign debt interest expenses. Revenue Canada prefers that Canadian banks financing the one billion newspaper sale price, with the lower 4 percent loan.
There is a concern, the new buyer will just add new debt and sell Canada's flagship newspapers into a debt mill IPO. Issues of corruption, and fair disclosure, when newspaper monopoly disclosure matrix controlled by one group. Best choice to up hold the right is to support a news reporter-employee, acquisition of Canada's pay-subscription newspaper monopoly, into a non profit. Newspaper widget fair, honest reporting is key to modern economy, and the Bank of Canada. Benefits the nation to have neutral newspapers, as much as that is possible.
In the financial storm of 2009, CanWest newspaper publishing 09 operating profit is 177 million. 08 operating profit 295 million. Newspapers publishing 1.1 billion revenue(09), and 1.3billion revenue in(08). Actual operating profit more than reported, as Canwest include extras minused into operating profit. Concern, the newspapers in bankrupcy protection will interfer with the short term results, newspapers still very profitable. http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/canwest-chain-leaves-300-creditors-unpaid/article1431891/
http://www.canada.com/business/fp/Bids+Canwest+papers+begin+take+shape/2457406/story.html
Sunday, February 21, 2010
Shaw cannot vote to reduce the fee-for-coverage CanWest accepts from the cable companies; as 80 percent of CanWest shareholders not Shaw Cable
Largest TV network in Canada, public company buy-in math. Shaw smart to buy CGS shares at anything below a dollar or more
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Shaw buy-in for 50% of Canwest is only 100 million, if Shaw invests 200 million. Shaw 20% buy-in of CanWest for 100 million, costs 80 million. Largest TV network in Canada, public company buy-in math.
Shaw smart to buy CGS shares on the open market, at anything below a dollar. Half of buy-in funds owned by new investor, when investor's capital stays in restructured public company. Hoping Shaw invests half billion, so costs Shaw 250 million for half of CanWest, a song for Shaw.
Shaw advised that Shaw Cable will have to still honour the CRTC fee-for-carriage rent. Since Shaw cannot vote to reduce the fee-for-coverage CanWest accepts from the cable companies; as 80 percent of CanWest shareholders not Shaw Cable -- more profitable to own a larger % of CanWest. CRTC fee-for-coverage settlement complicated, as new era of digital tv re-transmissions are copyright protected. Note, reject multi voting shares. Investors require fair public companies. It's a fact that a public company, controlled by multi voting shares, hampers raising capital from selling new shares, an example CanWest. Note, deal to include a Goldman Sachs settlement; and that all CanWest debt left, be paid out; as the Canadian banks want to finance all debt at five percent. Shaw's deal strengthens Goldman Sachs investment, cable company, TV company synergies.
Very good deal for Shaw to own 50 percent of the fees (or more), that Shaw and the the rest of telecoms and cable companies owe in fee-for-carriage fees, owed to Canada's largest TV network, Canwest. Shaw Communications shareholders number one concern.
SECCanada and Canwest shareholders embrace Shaw's brokers ,and ask for some respect. [8% Ad Hoc senior noteholders bonds, will not be covered into shares. Period.] Not fair to buy massive blocks of shares from the CanWest Treasury, and skip the stock market, completely; buy CanWest shares on the open market too Shaw.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Shaw buy-in for 50% of Canwest is only 100 million, if Shaw invests 200 million. Shaw 20% buy-in of CanWest for 100 million, costs 80 million. Largest TV network in Canada, public company buy-in math.
Shaw smart to buy CGS shares on the open market, at anything below a dollar. Half of buy-in funds owned by new investor, when investor's capital stays in restructured public company. Hoping Shaw invests half billion, so costs Shaw 250 million for half of CanWest, a song for Shaw.
Shaw advised that Shaw Cable will have to still honour the CRTC fee-for-carriage rent. Since Shaw cannot vote to reduce the fee-for-coverage CanWest accepts from the cable companies; as 80 percent of CanWest shareholders not Shaw Cable -- more profitable to own a larger % of CanWest. CRTC fee-for-coverage settlement complicated, as new era of digital tv re-transmissions are copyright protected. Note, reject multi voting shares. Investors require fair public companies. It's a fact that a public company, controlled by multi voting shares, hampers raising capital from selling new shares, an example CanWest. Note, deal to include a Goldman Sachs settlement; and that all CanWest debt left, be paid out; as the Canadian banks want to finance all debt at five percent. Shaw's deal strengthens Goldman Sachs investment, cable company, TV company synergies.
Very good deal for Shaw to own 50 percent of the fees (or more), that Shaw and the the rest of telecoms and cable companies owe in fee-for-carriage fees, owed to Canada's largest TV network, Canwest. Shaw Communications shareholders number one concern.
SECCanada and Canwest shareholders embrace Shaw's brokers ,and ask for some respect. [8% Ad Hoc senior noteholders bonds, will not be covered into shares. Period.] Not fair to buy massive blocks of shares from the CanWest Treasury, and skip the stock market, completely; buy CanWest shares on the open market too Shaw.
Wednesday, February 17, 2010
Contrary to your assertion, the CRTC is not holding back on a decision related to the television public proceeding due the recent ... purchase of CanW
File 482117: CRTC request that the two matters not be dealt with independently of each other.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Neil,
Thank you for taking the time to contact the CRTC expressing your concerns over the recent television hearings.
The CRTC is currently reviewing the material presented to the Commission during the fall public proceedings and will issue a decision in due course. Contrary to your assertion, the CRTC is not holding back on a decision related to the television public proceeding due the recent media coverage of the purchase of Canwest. I would like to point out that the CRTC has not received any application by Shaw for the purchase of Canwest at this time. The two matters will be dealt with independently of each other.
I trust this information will assist you.
Regards, CRTC, Client Services
Winnipeg1-877-249-2782
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Reference number: 482117 Thank you for contacting the CRTC. This is an automatic confirmation that we have received your message. If a further response is required, we should contact you within 10 working days. We apologize in advance for any delay that may be caused by the high volume of correspondence received in the Commission. If your request is urgent, for example, if it involves the disconnection of your telephone service, please contact Client Services toll-free at 1-877-249-2782 and provide the above-mentioned Reference Number. If you use a TDD, you can reach us toll-free at 1-877-909-2782. To reply or to add to your submission click here http://www.crtc.gc.ca/rapidsccm/landing.asp?lang=E&caseid=482117&key=40591.9244114583 This is the information included in your message. Industry of interest/concern: Television Type of message: Question Your Message: Conflict of interest for CRTC. Unfair of CRTC to delay their ruling on copyright for local tv stations signals, and pay-fo-use-system, a market based pay structure for-channel content; till after Shaw buys CanWest's TV assets.Obviously the Cable companies, Shaw specifically owes back payments for selling CanWest and Atlantis TV signals. Copyright infringement. The CRTC not issuing a decision on copyright of TV signals has in part created the CanWest Chapter 11. It is fraud for the CRTC to hold off on its signals decisioin till after CanWest sold off. The CRTC has a duty to makes its pay per signal decision before the Shaw TV sale can be approved.I wish to have a file number for this complaint. Thank you.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Neil,
Thank you for taking the time to contact the CRTC expressing your concerns over the recent television hearings.
The CRTC is currently reviewing the material presented to the Commission during the fall public proceedings and will issue a decision in due course. Contrary to your assertion, the CRTC is not holding back on a decision related to the television public proceeding due the recent media coverage of the purchase of Canwest. I would like to point out that the CRTC has not received any application by Shaw for the purchase of Canwest at this time. The two matters will be dealt with independently of each other.
I trust this information will assist you.
Regards, CRTC, Client Services
Winnipeg1-877-249-2782
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Reference number: 482117 Thank you for contacting the CRTC. This is an automatic confirmation that we have received your message. If a further response is required, we should contact you within 10 working days. We apologize in advance for any delay that may be caused by the high volume of correspondence received in the Commission. If your request is urgent, for example, if it involves the disconnection of your telephone service, please contact Client Services toll-free at 1-877-249-2782 and provide the above-mentioned Reference Number. If you use a TDD, you can reach us toll-free at 1-877-909-2782. To reply or to add to your submission click here http://www.crtc.gc.ca/rapidsccm/landing.asp?lang=E&caseid=482117&key=40591.9244114583 This is the information included in your message. Industry of interest/concern: Television Type of message: Question Your Message: Conflict of interest for CRTC. Unfair of CRTC to delay their ruling on copyright for local tv stations signals, and pay-fo-use-system, a market based pay structure for-channel content; till after Shaw buys CanWest's TV assets.Obviously the Cable companies, Shaw specifically owes back payments for selling CanWest and Atlantis TV signals. Copyright infringement. The CRTC not issuing a decision on copyright of TV signals has in part created the CanWest Chapter 11. It is fraud for the CRTC to hold off on its signals decisioin till after CanWest sold off. The CRTC has a duty to makes its pay per signal decision before the Shaw TV sale can be approved.I wish to have a file number for this complaint. Thank you.
Thursday, February 11, 2010
Eurpopes nations embrace the M4 money supply. Canadian dollar named the most expensive currency in the world. Excellent for Canadians.
Europe's governments will no longer pay interest on borrowing. It is the policy that all government of Europe to borrow at a zero percent interest rate from the European Federal Reserve. This as a policy will begin with the European Federal Reserve offering to finance all "new" loans of these governments at a 2 percent interest rate, several nations at same trough. After interest returned after issues like Greece's bailout sized up.
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[[ http://money.ca.msn.com/savings-debt/gallery/gallery.aspx?cp-documentid=23431350
Quote,"Across Europe, governments have gotten so used to piling up debt that the likelihood of them ever getting back to balanced budgets seems pretty slim.
But recent fears about Greece in particular have got investors thinking other countries with big deficits and sluggish economies might be riskier borrowers as well.
At issue is the stability of the government bonds issued by some EU members, the very sort of worry that got countries like Mexico and Argentina in trouble in decades past.
According to the European Central Bank, half of the 16 euro area countries are assessed as high risk in terms of the sustainability of their public finances. These include Ireland, Greece, Spain, Cyprus, Malta, the Netherlands, Slovenia and Slovakia."]]
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Issues with the European Banking reserves regulations proposed at Davos. Simply don't work. Misunderstanding of the core issues of reality. No such thing a saving currency in the macro sense, as the only reserves are obligations.
Alternative. Adjustment opportunity. The European Federal Reserve can also access funds through slowly buying debt already outstanding from the various european governments, reducing government costs.
Governments still owe and pay interest for past borrowing. Federal Reserve can access some of these funds governments pay in interest on this debt, by using m4 money supply to buy back some of this debt, but continue to have that nation pay the interest costs for that old debt, and now have access to these funds. Key to the European Union sticking together. Benefits good economies also as better to have the Federal Reserve own your debt, then others.
Also allows the Reserve to lower particular government interest costs, by buying their debt --the Reserve then will be refunded by that particular nation later. Novel way to allow debt buying of good economies, and use the extra to fund any European union countries government bailouts. Bond Rating services can better rate particular European governments, if the European Reserve has this active approach.
Bankrupcy consideration for Greece. Bonds trade based on the interest yield, and the current rate of yield available. Therefore costs more than a dollar to buy a dollar of debt for high interest rate debt. European Zone dealing with a limited Greece government bankrupcty, would see the resetting of certain Greece government bonds interest rates to a few percent. All debt will be honoured, just an interest rate adjustment. Honour is key.]
[Without this advance monetary economics technology, governments like Greece borrow at high rates, which will only further indebt the European Union. ]
Past university monetary theory can be improved. Needs metaphors, like the paradox that spending new or saved reserves by the federal bank, nearly the same effect (on limited spending). Aka governments' dream to one day be debt free and have a reserve. Yet if there, spending this reserve has the same effect in increasing the money supply, as if they created the credits of thin air. Can't save what does not exist. The emperor has no cloth. Noble prize for the monetary policy to have this data fit the engine of hope.
This theory cannot be separated from new developments in understanding how a balance of payment system works. International trade theory and access to local capital.
Parts in same engine. Canada always has a trade surplus, yet our currency lags. Canada's banks should be making more, considering that the modern economics term termed the Domestic bank of clearance effect. Basically all trade is dependent of the goodwill each nation's domestic banks to allow international trade. Need local bank cooperation to get access to that nation's currency. Canada
Also have Keynes multiplier effect, modernized into equations and waves. Example capital out there, and lack of access, and how this tap and lack of liquidity, affects economy. Part of the M4 money supply engine. [A nation with its own currency has a much easier time of it.]
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
[[ http://money.ca.msn.com/savings-debt/gallery/gallery.aspx?cp-documentid=23431350
Quote,"Across Europe, governments have gotten so used to piling up debt that the likelihood of them ever getting back to balanced budgets seems pretty slim.
But recent fears about Greece in particular have got investors thinking other countries with big deficits and sluggish economies might be riskier borrowers as well.
At issue is the stability of the government bonds issued by some EU members, the very sort of worry that got countries like Mexico and Argentina in trouble in decades past.
According to the European Central Bank, half of the 16 euro area countries are assessed as high risk in terms of the sustainability of their public finances. These include Ireland, Greece, Spain, Cyprus, Malta, the Netherlands, Slovenia and Slovakia."]]
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Issues with the European Banking reserves regulations proposed at Davos. Simply don't work. Misunderstanding of the core issues of reality. No such thing a saving currency in the macro sense, as the only reserves are obligations.
Alternative. Adjustment opportunity. The European Federal Reserve can also access funds through slowly buying debt already outstanding from the various european governments, reducing government costs.
Governments still owe and pay interest for past borrowing. Federal Reserve can access some of these funds governments pay in interest on this debt, by using m4 money supply to buy back some of this debt, but continue to have that nation pay the interest costs for that old debt, and now have access to these funds. Key to the European Union sticking together. Benefits good economies also as better to have the Federal Reserve own your debt, then others.
Also allows the Reserve to lower particular government interest costs, by buying their debt --the Reserve then will be refunded by that particular nation later. Novel way to allow debt buying of good economies, and use the extra to fund any European union countries government bailouts. Bond Rating services can better rate particular European governments, if the European Reserve has this active approach.
Bankrupcy consideration for Greece. Bonds trade based on the interest yield, and the current rate of yield available. Therefore costs more than a dollar to buy a dollar of debt for high interest rate debt. European Zone dealing with a limited Greece government bankrupcty, would see the resetting of certain Greece government bonds interest rates to a few percent. All debt will be honoured, just an interest rate adjustment. Honour is key.]
[Without this advance monetary economics technology, governments like Greece borrow at high rates, which will only further indebt the European Union. ]
Past university monetary theory can be improved. Needs metaphors, like the paradox that spending new or saved reserves by the federal bank, nearly the same effect (on limited spending). Aka governments' dream to one day be debt free and have a reserve. Yet if there, spending this reserve has the same effect in increasing the money supply, as if they created the credits of thin air. Can't save what does not exist. The emperor has no cloth. Noble prize for the monetary policy to have this data fit the engine of hope.
This theory cannot be separated from new developments in understanding how a balance of payment system works. International trade theory and access to local capital.
Parts in same engine. Canada always has a trade surplus, yet our currency lags. Canada's banks should be making more, considering that the modern economics term termed the Domestic bank of clearance effect. Basically all trade is dependent of the goodwill each nation's domestic banks to allow international trade. Need local bank cooperation to get access to that nation's currency. Canada
Also have Keynes multiplier effect, modernized into equations and waves. Example capital out there, and lack of access, and how this tap and lack of liquidity, affects economy. Part of the M4 money supply engine. [A nation with its own currency has a much easier time of it.]
Tuesday, February 9, 2010
Same time, same vendor financing deal expropriating CanWest shares - Arbitrator in 2009 awards final settlement in sale of Canada's newspapers in 2000
?
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Hollinger International's vendor financing agreement demands full repayment of loan, based on CanWest pre tax earnings. During when an abritrator is reworking aspects of this deal, and declares a final settlement. CanWest didn't even recieve the full 51 million settlement amount awarded. Quote, "Jan. 29, 2009 Canwest receives an arbitrated award of about $51-million for unresolved adjustments and claims surrounding the acquisition of newspaper assets from Hollinger."Quote, "In March 2009 Canwest in an arbitration award received $34 million in full settlement in its dispute with Hollinger International Inc."
http://www.financialpost.com/story.html?id=2071964
Hollinger paid a fine to CanWest for misrepresenting newspapers pre tax earnings, yet can expropirate the buyer company based on pre tax earnings. CanWest shareholders have rights.
Active concern of both our nations' securities regulators, that Hollinger International (Sun-times) as part of their US Chapter 11, in the disposition of the vendor financing agreemnt at 15 cents on the dollar. Holliinger International not banckrupt, if their CanWest bonds valued at real value. [Fifty nine papers sold for 5 million cheats the free market.]
Issues with a Canadian company selling Canada's newspapers, and transfering the vendor financing agreement off shore to avoid Canadian taxes. Could be that, certain hedge funds owe Canadian taxes on the the sale of the Canadian newspaper vendor financing agreement bonds. It is not right to depict these bonds as regular, as bonds registered under rule 144A, restricted from being sold on the open market in North America.
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CanWest sold Ten for more than 50.1% for 1.2 billion. Extra funds for Ten, CanWest Ten funds could pay down intercontect guaranteed debt, also pays interest costs of this debt. Ten stable.
Aug. 4, 2009Ten issues new stock, dilutes Canwest's stake Australian TV network Ten Network Holdings raises $124-million through equity offering to pay down debt but dilutes Canwest's stake to 50.1% from 57% in the process.
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CanWest has paid more that 60 to 70 percent of purchase price. Also gave shares. Also transfered not compete fees of 20 million. Also dervatives costs of hundreds of millions, and the 275 milliion bond restructuring the interest rate from12 to 8 percent. Seats on CanWest board. News control. An alterted CanWest financial documents like using interest rate averages to disclose debt to shareholders. Etc. [Ruling in Enron is that influencing debt disclosure is a billion dollar fine.]
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Hollinger International's vendor financing agreement demands full repayment of loan, based on CanWest pre tax earnings. During when an abritrator is reworking aspects of this deal, and declares a final settlement. CanWest didn't even recieve the full 51 million settlement amount awarded. Quote, "Jan. 29, 2009 Canwest receives an arbitrated award of about $51-million for unresolved adjustments and claims surrounding the acquisition of newspaper assets from Hollinger."Quote, "In March 2009 Canwest in an arbitration award received $34 million in full settlement in its dispute with Hollinger International Inc."
http://www.financialpost.com/story.html?id=2071964
Hollinger paid a fine to CanWest for misrepresenting newspapers pre tax earnings, yet can expropirate the buyer company based on pre tax earnings. CanWest shareholders have rights.
Active concern of both our nations' securities regulators, that Hollinger International (Sun-times) as part of their US Chapter 11, in the disposition of the vendor financing agreemnt at 15 cents on the dollar. Holliinger International not banckrupt, if their CanWest bonds valued at real value. [Fifty nine papers sold for 5 million cheats the free market.]
Issues with a Canadian company selling Canada's newspapers, and transfering the vendor financing agreement off shore to avoid Canadian taxes. Could be that, certain hedge funds owe Canadian taxes on the the sale of the Canadian newspaper vendor financing agreement bonds. It is not right to depict these bonds as regular, as bonds registered under rule 144A, restricted from being sold on the open market in North America.
~~~~~~~~~~
CanWest sold Ten for more than 50.1% for 1.2 billion. Extra funds for Ten, CanWest Ten funds could pay down intercontect guaranteed debt, also pays interest costs of this debt. Ten stable.
Aug. 4, 2009Ten issues new stock, dilutes Canwest's stake Australian TV network Ten Network Holdings raises $124-million through equity offering to pay down debt but dilutes Canwest's stake to 50.1% from 57% in the process.
~~~~~~~~~~
CanWest has paid more that 60 to 70 percent of purchase price. Also gave shares. Also transfered not compete fees of 20 million. Also dervatives costs of hundreds of millions, and the 275 milliion bond restructuring the interest rate from12 to 8 percent. Seats on CanWest board. News control. An alterted CanWest financial documents like using interest rate averages to disclose debt to shareholders. Etc. [Ruling in Enron is that influencing debt disclosure is a billion dollar fine.]
Hedge Funds expropratiing CanWest shares, have already tripled their original investment in the company -- according to Goldman Sachs investment bank
CanWest's senior unsecured debentures were traded for as little as 15 cents on the dollar over the past year. CanWest shareholders now buying this same debt, dollar for dollar.
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Quote, "Wall Street hedge fund Angelo Gordon, specializing in distressed-debt plays, has been buying CanWest debt since it filed for creditor protection in October. In hedge fund circles, there's [hope] that CanWest's bonds may eventually be worth far more than they currently command - about 70 cents on the dollar."
Angelo Gordon pruchase of CanWest bonds. http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/hedge-fund-buys-canwest-bonds/article1350531/
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Secondary source for 15 cent bonds. Same article mentions and omits the 15 cents on dollar purchase of CanWest bonds disclosure. Canadians and CanWest shareholder have been obstructed from accessing this disclousre.
http://www.friends.ca/news-item/8860 Sources the 15 cents on the dollar bonds, the purchase price for 97% of CanWest shares. [Very odd to buy a debt instrument and be paid 3 times on your loan in months.]
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/blogs/streetwise/canwest-beats-back-goldman-sachs/article1401779/ Same article omits referencing that CanWest debt sold for 15 cents on the dollar.
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Quote, "Wall Street hedge fund Angelo Gordon, specializing in distressed-debt plays, has been buying CanWest debt since it filed for creditor protection in October. In hedge fund circles, there's [hope] that CanWest's bonds may eventually be worth far more than they currently command - about 70 cents on the dollar."
Angelo Gordon pruchase of CanWest bonds. http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/hedge-fund-buys-canwest-bonds/article1350531/
~~~~
Secondary source for 15 cent bonds. Same article mentions and omits the 15 cents on dollar purchase of CanWest bonds disclosure. Canadians and CanWest shareholder have been obstructed from accessing this disclousre.
http://www.friends.ca/news-item/8860 Sources the 15 cents on the dollar bonds, the purchase price for 97% of CanWest shares. [Very odd to buy a debt instrument and be paid 3 times on your loan in months.]
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/blogs/streetwise/canwest-beats-back-goldman-sachs/article1401779/ Same article omits referencing that CanWest debt sold for 15 cents on the dollar.
Wall Street hedge fund Angelo Gordon, specializing in distressed-debt plays, has been buying CanWest debt since it filed for creditor protection in October. In hedge fund circles, there's hope that CanWest's bonds may eventually be worth far more than they currently command - about 70 cents on the dollar. [http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/hedge-fund-buys-canwest-bonds/article1350531/] Goldman Sachs in filings has argued that CanWest's major creditors – led by U.S. funds GoldenTree Asset, Beach Point Capital and Toronto's West Face Capital – have already tripled their original investment in the company. CanWest's senior unsecured debentures were traded for as little as 15 cents on the dollar over the past year.
Friday, February 5, 2010
Hedge Fund gang expropriating 97% of CanWest shares, complainted it was unfairly frozen out of great Canadian newspaper auction
Misinformation and mischief to report that Canada's banks running the show in CanWest bankruptcy. CanWest debt in US funds.
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CanWest debt program not from Canada, hence CanWest's (150 million 09 currency/interest hedging losses,) and (277 million 09 foreign currency gain.) Canadian banks concerned that the newspapers buyer backed by an international hedge fund with an agenda, will manipulate Canada's news, to consolidate (merge) Canada's banks.
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http://www.montrealgazette.com/news/todays-paper/Canwest+creditors+round/2515161/story.html
CanWest newspaper quote, "Unsecured bondholders for Canwest Global Communications Corp.'s newspaper division moved yesterday to insert themselves into a sales process being run by Canada's largest banks. In documents filed with the Ontario Superior Court, a group led by Golden Tree Asset Management LP said it was unfairly frozen out of the auction of Canwest Limited Partnership by the unit's senior secured lenders, which include the Bank of Nova Scotia and Canada's other four big commercial banks.
"Another source said the moves were made to give Golden Tree greater visibility in the sales process and limit the amount of control the banks could exercise." "Say the stalking horse bid (from the banks) is a billion dollars, and a bid comes in at a billion one. The banks can't simply say: 'No we like our bid better,' " the source said. "It gives them a say, and quite frankly gives them the option to take court action if they want to stop it."
"The group, which is owed about $400 million, won approval from Judge Sarah Pepall on several amendments to the procedure, including extending the window during which interested parties can come forward to bid from Feb. 26 to March 5."
[Lack of debate of newspaper buyer's point of view on editorial content in great Canadian newspaper auction.]
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CanWest debt program not from Canada, hence CanWest's (150 million 09 currency/interest hedging losses,) and (277 million 09 foreign currency gain.) Canadian banks concerned that the newspapers buyer backed by an international hedge fund with an agenda, will manipulate Canada's news, to consolidate (merge) Canada's banks.
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http://www.montrealgazette.com/news/todays-paper/Canwest+creditors+round/2515161/story.html
CanWest newspaper quote, "Unsecured bondholders for Canwest Global Communications Corp.'s newspaper division moved yesterday to insert themselves into a sales process being run by Canada's largest banks. In documents filed with the Ontario Superior Court, a group led by Golden Tree Asset Management LP said it was unfairly frozen out of the auction of Canwest Limited Partnership by the unit's senior secured lenders, which include the Bank of Nova Scotia and Canada's other four big commercial banks.
"Another source said the moves were made to give Golden Tree greater visibility in the sales process and limit the amount of control the banks could exercise." "Say the stalking horse bid (from the banks) is a billion dollars, and a bid comes in at a billion one. The banks can't simply say: 'No we like our bid better,' " the source said. "It gives them a say, and quite frankly gives them the option to take court action if they want to stop it."
"The group, which is owed about $400 million, won approval from Judge Sarah Pepall on several amendments to the procedure, including extending the window during which interested parties can come forward to bid from Feb. 26 to March 5."
[Lack of debate of newspaper buyer's point of view on editorial content in great Canadian newspaper auction.]
Thursday, February 4, 2010
Canadian banks seek changes to Canadian Bank Regulations to permit banks to own and operate businesses that have nothing to do with banking
Canada's banks to retool North America's industry into a clean energy, green economy
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Banks must be allowed to invest outside of banking. Canada has unofficial bank regulations that limit bank growth to banking.
Basically, banks do better to grow outside of banking. Key Bank Regulation: is that the banks themselves reduce their influence in other business sectors through share splits. Non banking industries developed by the banks are made into new public companies and shares given to bank shareholders. Awesome for bank shareholders. Bank, non banking share splits seed new stocks for stock market. Regulation includes that, there will be no bank mergers. Two banks can invest more than a combined bank.
Canada's banks are positioned very well to invest in other industries.
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Banks must be allowed to invest outside of banking. Canada has unofficial bank regulations that limit bank growth to banking.
Basically, banks do better to grow outside of banking. Key Bank Regulation: is that the banks themselves reduce their influence in other business sectors through share splits. Non banking industries developed by the banks are made into new public companies and shares given to bank shareholders. Awesome for bank shareholders. Bank, non banking share splits seed new stocks for stock market. Regulation includes that, there will be no bank mergers. Two banks can invest more than a combined bank.
Canada's banks are positioned very well to invest in other industries.
Hollinger International Chaper 11: Flock of US newspapers sold for 5 million and debt of 15 million. Chicago Tribune
[Does not include Tribune. Fact check. Sun Times Chicago's other newspaper.]
Sold for a song, yet Chicago Sun-Times employees and reporters take pay reductions, and not sold papers
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[Dozens of newspapers included as a bonus to banker insider. Non profit should have bought these newspapers, made for a better Chicago, and stronger America. Six percent of workforce fired and compensation costs reduced 15%, prior to sale. Assets to make a 5 million pre tax profit.]
Quote, " The last bit of Black's empire, the Chicago Sun-times , has been sold for 5 million. Neat how this works -- The Chicago investor group, led by banker James Tyree, agreed to pay about $5 million in cash and assume $20 million worth of the Sun-Time’s liabilities. Tyree’s group would get the media company’s 59 newspapers and websites including the Chicago flagship tabloid paper.[...]A Stalking-Horse bid is an initial bid on a bankrupt company’s assets from an interested buyer chosen by the bankrupt company. From a pool of bidders, the bankrupt company chooses the stalking horse to make the first bid, called the lead bidder. This method allows the distressed company to avoid low bids on its assets. Once the stalking horse has made its bid, other potential buyers may submit competing bids for the bankrupt company’s assets. However, it is unclear whether Sun-Times Media Group will have any other suitors, which has sought buyers for months, and has contacted more than 46 parties to gauge their interest.http://www.suntimes.comIt's clear now. The court accepted the "Stalking horse bid"
Pre sale quote, "[C]ompany is cutting pay for nonunion workers by 8 percent, indefinitely, if they make between $25,000 and $100,000. Those making over $100,000 will have their pay cut by 11 percent. The advertising sales staff is exempt, Halbreich said, because their pay has already fallen "significantly."
Quote"To slash expenses, Sun-Times fired 140 people, or 6% of its workforce, in April and said it would cut compensation costs by 15%. With more cuts, the company could perhaps generate a pretax profit of $5 million, Mr. Simonton says, suggesting a top sale price of $15 million."
http://hickeysite.blogspot.com/2009/10/james-tyrees-investment-group-get.html
Sold for a song, yet Chicago Sun-Times employees and reporters take pay reductions, and not sold papers
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[Dozens of newspapers included as a bonus to banker insider. Non profit should have bought these newspapers, made for a better Chicago, and stronger America. Six percent of workforce fired and compensation costs reduced 15%, prior to sale. Assets to make a 5 million pre tax profit.]
Quote, " The last bit of Black's empire, the Chicago Sun-times , has been sold for 5 million. Neat how this works -- The Chicago investor group, led by banker James Tyree, agreed to pay about $5 million in cash and assume $20 million worth of the Sun-Time’s liabilities. Tyree’s group would get the media company’s 59 newspapers and websites including the Chicago flagship tabloid paper.[...]A Stalking-Horse bid is an initial bid on a bankrupt company’s assets from an interested buyer chosen by the bankrupt company. From a pool of bidders, the bankrupt company chooses the stalking horse to make the first bid, called the lead bidder. This method allows the distressed company to avoid low bids on its assets. Once the stalking horse has made its bid, other potential buyers may submit competing bids for the bankrupt company’s assets. However, it is unclear whether Sun-Times Media Group will have any other suitors, which has sought buyers for months, and has contacted more than 46 parties to gauge their interest.http://www.suntimes.comIt's clear now. The court accepted the "Stalking horse bid"
Pre sale quote, "[C]ompany is cutting pay for nonunion workers by 8 percent, indefinitely, if they make between $25,000 and $100,000. Those making over $100,000 will have their pay cut by 11 percent. The advertising sales staff is exempt, Halbreich said, because their pay has already fallen "significantly."
Quote"To slash expenses, Sun-Times fired 140 people, or 6% of its workforce, in April and said it would cut compensation costs by 15%. With more cuts, the company could perhaps generate a pretax profit of $5 million, Mr. Simonton says, suggesting a top sale price of $15 million."
http://hickeysite.blogspot.com/2009/10/james-tyrees-investment-group-get.html
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